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 Traditions and Changes in Chinese Business Organizations 
under the Policy of Economic Reform 
CHAPTER 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
I was a Marketing Manager in Hong Kong for two years. I often traveled to 
Shenzhen and to other parts of southern China. It was a common observation that upon 
returning to Hong Kong after a short trip, I would find another new building squeezing its 
way up in the Central District. The miraculous success of Shenzhen is even more 
amazing. I often told my clients, mostly international visitors, as we drove through 
southern China "Every minute you will see a construction site, and every five minutes you 
will see a Mercedes Benz drive by." 
Shenzhen's primary advantage is its proximity to Hong Kong, the bustling British 
colony that will revert to Chinese control on July 1, 1997. Foreign investors, mostly Hong 
Kong investors, see Shenzhen as a gateway to the huge consumer markets in China. My 
company, for instance, has a US$50 million industrial project -- a distribution center, 
specially built for global companies to tap the China market. As the 1997 deadline 
approaches, it is becoming more apparent that a smooth marriage of capitalism and 
communism between Hong Kong and China is vital to both economies. These economies 
already have worked closely together. While Shenzhen supplies Hong Kong with 
abundant labor, Hong Kong investors bring abundant financial resources to build a 
manufacturing infrastructure in Shenzhen. Specifically, this has meant an abundant supply 2 
of electricity, better roads, airports, highways, telecommunications systems, and housing 
for Shenzhen. Hong Kong entrepreneurs also have brought in technology, know-how, 
and Western management skills to help China leap into the 20th Century. China has used 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to achieve some of its goals -- to improve its 
telecommunications, infrastructure, and electricity in the past decade. However, little is 
known about whether China has used the Shenzhen SEZ to achieve its other goal -- to 
adopt management techniques. 
Despite the miraculous success in Shenzhen, its continued success will depend on 
management skills.  It is the enterprise managers  the actual end users of new 
technologies  who will determine the pace at which China will catch up with the rest of 
the world. In the ever changing environment of the 1990s, all sizes -- small, medium and 
large of Chinese enterprises have been struggling to reform and modernize, hoping that 
changes could bring competitiveness with Western technology, know-how and 
management techniques. What changes have been occurring in Chinese business 
enterprises? What traditional Chinese values have been retained and what Western values 
have been adopted? These are the questions I will examine as China opens up to join the 
world community. What seems like a small change on the surface or in daily behavior 
might actually change values and elements central to traditional Chinese ways of living and 
working. 
To a very large extent, "management" is a Western notion based on Western 
assumptions and norms. The vast majority of organizational behavioral research and the 
main theoretical models have come from highly individualistic Western societies. The 3 
problems in cross-cultural management have been discussed by Adler (1986). According 
to Lee's article in 1991, management is culturally bounded. In China, assumptions and 
values differ greatly from the West. Unlike Western counterparts, Chinese managers 
perform a variety of tasks and have different roles. Chinese managers also are influenced 
by cultural characteristics: familism, paternalism, and personalism. In this thesis, I will 
examine these three characteristic features of Chinese business organizations. I hope my 
thesis will offer suggestions regarding Chinese management theory, thus helping China 
leap into the Twentieth Century. 
Statement of Purpose 
This paper looks at small, medium, and large Chinese business organizations in 
SEZ and non-SEZ areas. My attempt is to examine the traditions and changes in these 
organizations under China's economic reform program. In an ever-changing environment, 
I want to find out what traditional Chinese values have been retained, what values have 
been lost, and what new concepts have been adopted. In doing so, I will explore the 
notion of a well-defined Chinese business culture.  I particularly want to investigate the 
core cultural values of Chinese family business culture. Family is important in every 
culture, but it is especially important in Chinese culture. I believe Chinese family-based 
business organization has significant implications from a management point of view. As 
Chinese enterprises have been undergoing drastic changes in the past few years, it is my 
desire to share with the reader my experience in China. My search for an explanation for 4 
the recent burst of economic activity, which has no precedent in Chinese history, also has 
influenced me to conduct this study. 
Problem Definition 
Three years ago, when I told my mother I was going to China to conduct my 
study, she almost cried. My mother was concerned about my safety and the hardship I had 
to endure in China. I traveled to China once when I was a teenager. I did not know too 
much about real lives of people in China. Despite many success stories reported on 
private enterprises in the SEZ, I was stuck by the lack of information on China's state-
owned enterprises in non-SEZ areas.  Armed with a mission of discovery and an intense 
curiosity, I embarked on my journey to learn about China. 
Here, I define types of Chinese business enterprises myself, according to their size, 
location and number of employees because information on number of sales and profits are 
difficult to obtain especially in a single interview with someone I had not previously met. 
Small enterprises refer to those that employ fifty to less than two hundred employees. 
They are traditional Chinese family business enterprises having only family members hold 
important positions. They usually are located in rural areas with a low level of interaction 
with other foreign cultures.  Medium-size enterprises are defined as those that employ 
two hundred to eight hundred workers. They are mostly private enterprises or joint 
ventures located in the SEZs or China's coastal cities. The medium-size enterprises enjoy 
more investment freedom and their products are commonly sold overseas so that they 5 
have lots of contacts with the West. In an constantly changing environment, medium-size 
enterprises are undergoing a major transition. 
Large enterprises here refer to China's state-owned enterprises. They usually 
employ eight hundred or more employees. Large enterprises are usually located inland in 
non-SEZ cities and are not much influenced by the West. In the past decade, large 
enterprises were subjected to drastic changes under China's economic reform policy. 6 
CHAPTER 2
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
Confucianism 
Just as sociologist Max Weber established a link between Seventeenth Century 
Protestantism and the behavior of modern capitalists in Western Europe, Gorden Redding 
found Chinese management driven by a set of cultural values largely based on 
Confucianism. 
Confucianism was not a religion as such. It was a set of guidelines to civilized 
conduct (Redding 1990:84). In order to be civilized, an individual must fit into and 
conform with the basic social order of his surrounding world. From the Sixth to Third 
Century B.C., Confucius codified the ties of individual, family, and society that defined a 
person's proper place and position. During China's long history of political upheaval and 
natural disaster, these well-defined relations often helped to keep social order. The 
purpose of Confucianism was to provide a hierarchical form of order linking the individual 
and the state. Thus, ultimately to maintain social stability. 
The self sufficiency of the family unit, Jia, (family) formed a rational collective 
response to the surrounding circumstances (Cohen 1976:11); for the Chinese it was the 
only insurance against disaster. The collective form of Jia (family), was Guo, (state). 
According to the Confucian way, the state was in essence the super-family of Chinese 
people. Within this structure, social stability was founded on morally enriched 
prescriptions for relationships. Thus, the individual found dignity and harmony within 7 
one's own social context. A good individual had moral sense of righteousness, beauty, 
harmony, and order, and the emperor was charged with exemplifying precisely the same 
virtues. This was the morally binding relationship connecting all individuals in society. In 
this the self was not an enclosed world of private thoughts (Tu 1984: 5). The Chinese 
word for 'human', contained shades of meaning not found in Western cultures. In the 
Chinese perception, the idea of a person included relationships and was not separate from 
them. The individual was a connection, and the "totalness" of society was passed down 
from one binding relationship to the next (Redding 1990:43-44). Taoist virtues of `wu­
wei' and selflessness flow in the same direction. 
Men should lose themselves in Tao as fish lose themselves in water. Your 
self is a body lent to you by the universe... You do not own yourself. With 
Confucianism, it is no longer the cosmic reality which takes precedence 
over the individual, but his family, his clan, his sovereign. The great­
hearted man cultivates his virtues in order to serve society (Jiang 
1980:136). 
The basic building block of the stable Confucian order was the family, and within 
that, the crucial stabilizing feature was filial piety (Redding 1990:49). 
Filial piety was a theme derived from the nature of what Weber saw as the 
"patrimonial" state, the distinguishing feature of which was that the ultimate power rested 
with the head of state, it was personal and was dispensed and dispersed by representatives 
who also interpreted it personally. 
For this system termini stable required a form of authority seen as 
legitimate by those subjected to it, the Chinese solution to this challenge 
being strict role compliance by both parties. If roles were strictly followed, 
power was not abused, and Confucian doctrine aimed to produce just such 8 
acceptable leaders, respected for their wisdom, humanity, and propriety 
(Weber 1951: 228). 
A feature that enhanced the power of the father-figure was the common ownership 
of family belongings. Possessions were normally seen as belonging to the group, not an 
individual. Without clear independent resources, the individual remained bound and to 
some degree disenfranchised. Naturally, there was tension in many families, and naturally 
there were people who succeeded in breaking away, but the norm was conformity, and 
acceptance that the price of protection was loyalty to the father. 
The Chinese person emerged from up to twenty years of disciplined paternalism in 
the family, having a strong sense of vertical order in society (Redding 1990:61). Thus, in 
China, people understood that they fit naturally below some people, and, just as 
significantly, above others. A superior position carried obligation. Abuse of the 
responsibilities would undermine authority and destroy the allegiance of those below. The 
core of the responsibility was the paternal concern for the subordinates' general welfare, 
something for which much conformity was offered in return. The cultivation of filial piety 
devotion to the father stemmed from the heart of family, and to the large as social context 
of the state; thus, creating a vertical order unique for Chinese. 
Chinese networks, synonymous in China with the term guanxi' , began in response 
to the problem of growing and protecting family resources. All families were subjected to 
the same regime and none had any choice but to see their milieu as fundamentally 
competitive. Open conflicts and overt self-interest were improper Chinese behaviors. 
Aggressive desires and emotions generally were sublimated. The creation of wealth in a 9 
family unit could not be managed in isolation; it occurred in the context of buying and 
selling information, borrowing money, and seeking advice. Aspiring families had to 
establish a network of necessary connections; and to make such networks operated 
reliably, Chinese society had to attach central important to the notion of trust (Redding 
1990:66-69). 
Trust for Chinese was very specifically circumscribed. It was limited to the 
partners in the bond. It worked on the basis of personal obligations, the maintenance of 
reputation and face. The important of trust served to make the network strong, as 
individuals feared to infringe on such a powerful norm. It also pointed up the inability to 
connect into society where the network did not penetrate, and the fact that work was 
needed to establish it. The Chinese found it difficult to establish a relationship if they did 
not trust a person. They had to work at creating trust beforehand. 
Chinese had a tendency to allow personal relationships to enter into decision-
making. In the feudal societies, where power was highly concentrated in the hands of key 
people, the workings of society reflected that particular distribution of power. It was not 
what you know, it was who you know, and the "who" were people with the right 
guanxi'  (connections). At the extreme, it became impossible to make anything happen 
without access to the blessing of those in the key positions, and successful organizational 
life came to be based on the building and maintenance of the appropriate contacts. 10 
Business Implication of Confucianism 
The importance of the father figure in the family found support in the Confucian 
value of paternalism. This was reflected in Chinese family businesses where the proprietor 
expected staff loyalty in exchange for his benevolence. In their business dealings, Chinese 
manager preferred to deal with fellow Chinese they could trust because, unlike in the 
West, there was no well-developed legal system to rely on. The father-figure was 
respected and had authority. Chinese business organizations had little need for 
organization charts and job descriptions because people just fit in as family. 
Since the Chinese family business was a form of organization dominated by a 
single individual and based on the personal loyalty of a certain set of people, problems 
arose when the company expanded overseas and when the proprietor had to hire and deal 
with people he did not know and could not trust. This also explains why many Chinese 
family-style firms were small-to-medium size manufacturing operations with their products 
carrying little-known brand names. Setting up a big brand-name operation entailed a great 
deal of decentralization of power to marketing people from all over the world. This was 
inconceivable to the typical Chinese proprietor (Redding :  1990). 
Familism, Paternalism, and Personalism 
Familism -- Family oriented. The organization as a family metaphor depicted 
parents and children. The concepts of the order of old and young, senior and junior, 
obedience and cooperation, harmony and prosperity, are the ideology of a Chinese family. 11 
Management played the role of a parent who took care of, and disciplined the children 
(Lee 1991:191). 
Paternalism -- Power oriented. The organization as a power metaphor emphasized 
relationships of unequal power, including father and son, shareholders and workers, the 
old and new generation. This power could be authority power, like Weber's patrimonial 
relationship power, expert power, or family power. Power struggles among people were 
the reality. The manager was the person who could manipulate the conflict for 
organizational success (Lee 1991:191). 
Hamilton (1984) had provided a valuable revision to the classic description 
by Weber of how the patrimonial state worked in the case of China. In 
simple terms, Weber's position was that the Chinese state had become 
frozen in the mechanism it used for processes of domination, and these 
were similar to those adopted in ancient Greece and more especially Rome. 
The principle which Weber saw applying to both was the power vested in 
the head of the household to maintain its internal peace, such power being 
enshrined in the formal legal system (Redding 1990:127-128). 
Personalism -- People oriented. The organization as a person metaphor described 
the organization as human being that had life. There were practical and spiritual aspects in 
the organizational reality. Management was the soul of a human being while exhibiting 
ideology and values. Managers were expected to be nurturing, benevolent, kind, 
sympathetic and compassionate figures who inspired commitment and dedication (Lee 
1991:191). 
In sum, the prime characteristics of Chinese culture appear to be collective. A 
collective orientation implies an emphasis on relationships, harmony, 
These Confucian values support a formal and clearly specified organ 12 
unambiguous authority relationships, low internal competition, harmony in management 
and labor relationships, with centralized authority resting at the top. In terms of 
leadership, Chinese values place greater weight upon ascribed rather than achieved status 
and upon across all roles rather than confined to one male status. In addition, Chinese 
values focus upon the formal authority and the interpersonal abilities of the manager 
(Vertinsky 1990:854). 
Chinese managers emphasize the concepts of loyalty, obligation, happiness, and 
honor. In Chinese managers' view, economic life cannot be segregated from life as a 
whole. People should not be treated as mere units who produce profit. Profit is not 
defined only as money but as the sum total of human happiness. Chinese consider a job as 
a personal relationship. Workers expect to be treated as whole persons, not merely as 
recipients of a salary in return for doing a job. Success is meaningful when imbued with a 
social purpose. A good Chinese manager is not simply competent but also compassionate 
in protecting the livelihood of employees (Hari 1991: 2-3). 
The Chinese identity comes from the family and the Chinese organizational 
culture is an extension of family-centered life in which most employees have been raised. 
The bottom line of such a culture simply means the employer took good care of employees 
by making them secure and taking out the bumps in life caused by financial or emotional 
hurdles. In exchange, employees freely gave their trust and whole-hearted performance to 
the company, thereby creating stability (Tang and Whiteley 1991:18-19) 13 
Chinese Family Business 
Chinese family business (CFB) refers to the kind of business where no one other 
than family members control ownership and hold important management positions. 
Chinese family business is relatively small. As these enterprises continue to grow, they are 
confronted with the challenge of either modernizing the management system with the help 
of non-family members or preferably hiring professional managers. However, the problem 
is -- CFB enterprises did not trust outsiders; and even if they trust them, how many they 
can trust is a problem. Thus, as CFB is moving through a rapidly changing business 
environment which will have a tremendous impact on the evolution of the CFB itself 
(Chen 1995:84). 
The dominant ideology of CFB can be summarized by Weber's word 
"patrimonialism" which covers a wide range of themes such as paternalism, hierarchy, 
mutual obligation, responsibility, familism, personalism, and connection (Redding 
1990:155). Several interrelated influences are derived from theses themes: the notion that 
power and authority were closely connected to ownership; autocratic leadership, which 
was sometimes coated with benevolence; and a personalistic style of management. 
Like business organization in the other cultures, the CFB has been under constant 
pressure to change. The new generation of Chinese managers, trained in the west, have 
tried to close the gap between the West and Chinese organizations. With the upgrading of 
their technical level, many CFBs would have to readjust their traditional distrust of 
professional employees (Redding 1990:94). 14 
Nevertheless, all these changes do not mean that the CFBs are becoming a passing 
phenomenon, nor are they losing their uniquely competitive features. What the CFB really 
needs to do is to expand cohesiveness within the core of family members so that 
professionals and ordinary employees will be able to identity themselves with the CFB. 
This means to apply the concept of family to all employee so that they feel emotionally 
attached to the company. The role of personalism in management should be restricted so 
that everyone has real incentives to work hard for the company. Only in such an 
organization will the Confucian ethics of loyalty, diligence, sincerity, and harmony, be 
given full play (Chen 1995:84-94). 
Chinese State-owned Enterprise 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (CSE) are owned by the state. The CSEs, 
especially the large ones had been at the center of China's economic development. As of 
1992, China had 11,000 CSEs which occupied 2.9 percent of all industrial enterprises in 
the country. Together, they made up nearly 50 percent of China's total industrial value 
and 67 percent of the nation's tax revenue (Wu 1992:17). Since 1979, CSEs had made an 
effort to improve their performance as China's socialist economic system changes into a 
market system. Without market reform it would not have been possible to reform the 
CSEs (Chen 1995:113). 
Since 1979, reform has greatly changed the operational environment of the CSEs. 
First, most leaders agreed that the old highly centralized model was obsolete. In response, 
there was a gradual reduction of content and scope of state planning control. By 1984, 15 
only 30 percent to 40 percent of industrial production was under planning control. This 
meant that the CSEs had obtained more decision-making and control power and that the 
role of market had greatly increased (Cao 1991:4). 
Some separation has been achieved in the relation between the government and 
state-owned enterprises. The state has gradually separated ownership from the power of 
management in many CSEs. Typically the state enjoys ownership, while the CESs have 
the right to manage. More accurately, the state has implemented a contractual 
responsibility system wherein contracts spell out the sharing of interests, responsibilities 
and powers between the state and the CSEs. 
The market system has developed too. The state readjusted and promulgated a 
series of new policies starting in 1979. Changes in financial and taxation policies meant the 
CSEs began to enjoy the status of independent accounting units. On 1 June 1983, the 
government replaced profit remission with an income tax. CSEs were required to pay 55 
percent of their profit as tax. This severed their direct relationship with government 
(Jackson 1992:102-107), and any after-tax profits were then retained by the enterprises. 
Therefore, there was an incentive to better manage the enterprises, since profits could now 
be retained by the firm. Furthermore, the state was no longer the only investor (Chen 
1995:123). 
CSEs could raise funds through a variety of channels. One of the most frequently 
used was bank credit. The number of goods with prices controlled by the state has 
diminished, and more consumer prices are being freely set. Thus, enterprises have 
basically gained control of the right to set prices. 16 
Fundamental changes in personnel and labor policies have impacted CSEs. A 
contract system' has been established for both party cadres and workers, and the 
traditional life-time employment system has been significantly weakened. The CESs have 
increasingly begun to enjoy the right to hire managers, employ workers, and decide on 
how operations should be organized. 
In sum, the general operational environment of the CSEs has been shifting from 
the a commodity economy model to a market economy model. The state has begun to 
reduce substantially its role in the economy, which has facilitated the transformation of the 
CSEs. The significance of the changes lies in the fact that the CSEs have begun the 
process of changing into independent entities operating freely within the market (Chen 
1995:122-123). 
China's Economic Reform 
From 1949 - 1979, China was a planned economy with tight social and economic 
controls. Economic organization and management were central to the system. Initially, 
the PRC adopted a Stalinist system of industrial management. The main characteristics of 
this system included a high degree of centralization with clear, detailed plans and standard 
operating procedures for their implementation. Risk aversion and adherence to formal 
rules dominated. Within the enterprise a pluralistic structure was adopted. This pluralistic 
structure consisted of the Director, the Enterprise Party Committee, the Worker's 
The contractor is given a sum of money in exchange for agreeing to meet the conditions of the contract, 
whether it involves safety, production etc. The contractor is fully responsible for the monetary losses in 
case the contract conditions are not met. However, if the conditions are met, the contractor can keep the 
money. 17 
Congress, and the Trade Union Committee. Though the balance of power among the four 
institutions shifted over time, a tradition of limited participation of workers as part of the 
formal structure was always present. 
In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the eleventh Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party took the historic decision to shift the emphasis of the 
nation's effort to the drive for economic development and the building of a socialist 
society while keeping specific Chinese characteristics. Two fundamental points were 
stressed: the need to observe the four cardinal principles -- adherence to the socialist path, 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, democratic dictatorship of the people, and 
loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought -- and the need both to 
implement policies that would open the country to the outside world and to carry out the 
necessary reforms at home. Reforming the economic structure meant transforming a 
highly centralized system into a decentralized socialist market economy that would permit 
a vigorous development of production and distribution (Sha 1987:692). 
Reform proceeded step by step in an orderly fashion under the leadership of the 
Communist Party and the government. Changes were introduced in such a way as to 
avoid harmful disruptions and to enhance social stability, expand production, make more 
efficient use of national resources and achieve a higher standard of living for the people. 
Since 1978, a process of experimentation with organizational reform has led to 
several important modifications of the economic system. As part of these changes, the 
reforms introduced a new motivational system officially promulgated by the State Council 
in 1984 as the "Responsibility System." The basic principles of this system were a 18 
combination of "responsibility, authority, and benefit" or "simply a performance-oriented 
organization." The new imperative was to "calculate profit prior to action" rather than 
"action before calculation" (Henley & Nyaw, 1986). Rationalization of management 
techniques with a strong emphasis on the introduction of means-ends analysis 
characterized the normative basis of these reforms (Vertinsky 1990:855). 
By the late 1970s it had become clear that if these enterprises were to be 
revitalized, two types of relationships would have to be sorted out satisfactorily. First, the 
relationship between the State and the enterprises owned by it needed to be clarified by 
separating ownership from the authority to operate and manage, and by giving enterprises 
greater decision-making power. Second, the relationship between the enterprises and their 
employees also needed to be spelled out to safeguard the status of the latter as the masters 
in their own house. 
At its twelfth Congress held in 1982, the Chinese Communist Party approved the 
country's economic goals for the coming two decades: to quadruple gross agricultural and 
industrial output and to increase annual per capital income from US$250 in 1980 to 
US$800 or US$1,000 by the year two thousand. That would enable the Chinese people, 
though still far from affluent, to enjoy a fairly comfortable standard of living. 
According to the Decision Document of 1984: 
Modern enterprises had a minute division of labor, a high degree of 
continuity in production, strict technological requirements and complex 
relations of cooperation. It was therefore necessary to establish a unified, 
authoritative and highly efficient system to direct production and conduct 
operations and management. This called for a system of the managing 
director assuming full responsibility." This document also prescribed that 
"enterprises must specify in explicit terms the requirements for each work 
post and the duties of each worker and staff member and must establish 19 
various forms of the economic responsibility system with contracted jobs as 
the main content so as to invigorate the urban enterprises, raise the sense of 
responsibility of workers and staff members and bring into full play their 
initiative, enthusiasm and creativity." The system as a whole, though 
somewhat more flexible at the plant level, still retains a high degree of 
centralization and control ( Vertinsky 1990:856). 
The 1984 reform thus modified the mechanism for worker participation in the 
design of business organizations, introduced the values of teleological structure (i.e., 
means-end orientation), emphasized formality of authority structures, and promoted the 
value of adaptiveness and flexibility within a rigid structure. In terms of leadership, the 
reform emphasized values of innovation and experimentation. The importance of general 
managerial skills such as interpersonal and rational decision-making skills were also 
upgraded. 
The Chinese government was continuing its efforts to implement managerial 
reform. In attempting to protect its political system, however, the government tried to 
insulate its people from uncontrolled foreign influences and increased its selectivity in 
recruiting candidates for management positions and international contacts (Vertinsky 
1990:856). 20 
CHAPTER 3
 
ETHNOGRAPHIC METHOD
 
I started out with a research topic of great interest to me. Since this was a new 
topic, I used exploratory methods when collected my data. Data collection turned out to 
be the most interesting part of my research. 
In-depth interviews served as the primary data gathering instrument for my 
research. All of the interviews were conducted in Chinese and later translated into 
English.  I then analyzed all data with a focus on familism, paternalism, and personalism -­
the three distinct features of Chinese traditional management techniques. 
I defined familism as an organization where shareholders, partners, and key 
managers were all members of the family.  I defined paternalism as an organization having 
centralized power control and a hierarchical order with father-figure exhibiting 
benevolence to employees.  In a paternalistic organization, employees are not given well-
defined responsibilities and duties for they simply fit in and perform any task assigned by 
the manager. Allowing employees to be creative, innovative, to diversify product ranges 
were taken as the opposition of paternalism. I saw these features as serving to 
decentralize power.  I defined personalism as an organization concerned most about 
guanxi' (connections). Life-time employment was defined as personalism instead of 
familism simply because life-time employees are not necessary family members. I saw 
employers march under the banner of 'we are family' to cultivate "guanxi" with employees 
as a mean to earn trust, loyalty, and full commitment from employees. 21 
I used qualitative research methods, with emphasis on intensive interviewing. 
Qualitative methods presented both opportunities and potential problems for my research. 
I relied almost exclusively on data gathered from subjects through interviews which could 
be subject to the biases of the researcher. However, biases were off-set by self-awareness 
as much as possible. Lee 1991:189 said: 
The advantage was the researcher's ability to probe the deep meaning of 
the subjects studied. Qualitative research methodology required certain 
qualities of the researcher. An "insider" of the culture might be best able to 
perceive, penetrate, and explore the insights of the reality construction of 
the subjects studied. 
I took a three-step approach in data collection. I talked both at length and briefly 
with a number of managers and workers. In this thesis, I am reporting on only the most 
comprehensive interviews which included a total of thirty managers from fifteen 
enterprises.  First, I studied seven small enterprises with ten managers in Jiang Shek 
village.  I did a case study on a typical family business organization and interviewed six 
board of directors. Second, I studied two medium-size private enterprises and interviewed 
six managers in both Shenzhen and Xiamen SEZs. Third, I interviewed four large state-
owned enterprises with seven managers in Tianjin, a non-SEZ. In addition, I studied a 
medium-size state-owned enterprise and interviewed one general manager in Xiamen SEZ. 
My attempt was to examine traditional Chinese management techniques and study changes 
in these three types of enterprises. 
In an effort to obtain detailed information for this study, I relied mostly on 
participant observation, semi-structured, and unstructured interviewing during my field 22 
work conducted from June to October 1992. Casual conversations with managers of 
state-owned enterprises provided me with invaluable information that I could never have 
collected in more structured interview sessions. 
To study small enterprises, I used a snowball sample in a small village at the 
outskirts of the Shenzhen SEZ. There was no documentation available on the enterprises 
scattered throughout the village.  I studied enterprises located in a clustered group. I 
stayed in this area and lived with managers and workers in the factory for two weeks. I 
first felt my sample was unrepresentative, but later found otherwise. Snowball sampling 
was effective when dealing with a relatively small population where managers were likely 
to be in contact with one another. After talking to ten managers of seven enterprises in 
the village, I discovered a similar pattern among these enterprises and the enterprise I lived 
in.  I found Yuen Fung Factory to exemplify traditional Chinese family-style management. 
I studied two medium-size enterprises in the SEZs. One enterprise was located in 
the city center of Shenzhen. Another was situated in the industrial development zone of 
Xiamen. My semi-structured questions were based on a review of management literature. 
My question was item adapted and derived from Dr. McGregor's questionnaire for 
management (McGregor-Hill 1960). I used these questions to indicate whether Western 
management techniques were being adopted by medium-size enterprises in the SEZs. 
To a very large extent, "management" was a western notion and was based 
on western assumptions and norms. The vast majority of organizational 
behavioral research and the main theoretical models had come from highly 
individualistic western societies. (Lee 1991:188) 
Until recently, most of our understandings of management came from the 
American experience: Americans and American-trained researchers 23 
observed the behavior of people in United States-based organizations. 
Based on their observations and research, they developed models and 
theories to explain the behavior. (Lee 1991:188). 
I expected managers of SEZ's medium-size enterprises would have adopted more 
western management values than their non SEZ counterparts. I tried to understand how 
managers viewed their workers. Were they lazy? Did they need close supervision and 
clear directions? Did they work for money and constantly desire higher pay? Did they 
need to be pushed or inspired? I also wanted to understand whether managers allowed 
workers to have freedom at work, trusted their judgment in solving problems, allowed 
them to exercise initiative, and delegated power to employees. 
I spoke native Cantonese and had no difficulty in collecting my data in the SEZs. I 
moved freely around the village alone and did my interviews everyday. Consequently, I 
completed a case study on a small business enterprise, and two medium-size private 
enterprises located in Shenzhen and Xiamen SEZs respectively.  I felt comfortable with my 
findings in the SEZs. 
I shared the same room with Hui Ning, a local worker, when I was in the village 
near Shenzhen. She said she planned to go home for two weeks. I suggested that I go 
with her and she gladly accepted. By early August of 1992, we were in Tianjin. 
I studied four large state-owned enterprises in Tianjin. My ethnographic tools 
were participant observation and unstructured interviews with snowball sampling. I feared 
my would be sample biased because Tianjin is a large city where a large number of state-
owned enterprises are located. This apprehension was exacerbated when I came to realize 
I could only interview better known, better run, and more profitable state-owned 24 
enterprises.  I could not gain access to failing state-owned enterprises, for Chinese 
managers had a pervasive fear of losing face. Altogether, I interviewed seven managers 
from four relatively successful state-owned enterprises. 
Due to a slight language barrier, I had more limitations in Tianjin than in Shenzhen. 
I was not used to the heavy northern Mandarin accent, and my interviewees were not used 
to my Hong Kong Mandarin accent. However, this limitation should not detract my 
findings, for we could share Chinese text when things needed to be clarified. Problems 
emerged when my Chinese identity was rejected. Tianjin people did not consider me to be 
Chinese, but called me a "foreigner" or an "overseas Chinese". This identity probably 
resulted because I was being introduced as a student from the United States and I was a 
Hong Kong-Chinese. Since I was seen as an "outsider", this created difficulties in 
establishing rapport.  But being cast as an outsider may have advantages as well. "Yet, a 
better understanding of a culture, a more distinct perspective was often perceived by an 
`outsider' (Lee 1991:189). 
Managers in state-own enterprises were overwhelmed with changes since the late 
1980s. In this situation, I found unstructured interviewing, to let interviewees lead into 
their own topics, extremely effective. Casual talk with managers provided me invaluable 
information that I could not have collected otherwise. My interviewees were keen on 
telling me about changes happening in their enterprises which led to profit increases. As a 
result, my notes were filled with information about policy changes in state-owned 
enterprises. This created inconsistency in my data. But, data on policy changes data were 
true and rich and could be very significant. In this case, I had incorporated my own 25 
experience and interpretations into data analysis. To be able to interpret subjectively, 
added to the effectiveness of my work as an ethnographer. 
To observe, to listen, and to incorporate my own interpretation of their 
experience from them, their experience become my experience. This is the 
essence of ethnographer. (Bernard 1989) 
I tried to keep a balance of gender in interviewing company executives, upper and 
middle managers, line supervisors, and workers. I did not use a tape recorded because I 
did not want to make anyone uncomfortable. I used shorthand, English mixed with 
Chinese to expedite my note taking. All in-depth interviews were conducted in private 
lasting 60 to 150 minutes. I am fully aware there is no substitute for a good story well 
told. 
After all interviews were completed, data were translated and reviewed. An 
attempt was made to identify the main themes and to categorized them in ways that would 
allow the subject's frame of interpretation to be revealed in sequential and systematic 
fashion. 
All data were collected from June to October, 1992. 26 
CHAPTER 4
 
SMALL BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
 
Interview : 
Jiang Shek Village
 
Mr. Ma, The Former Party Secretary
 
Baoan District, Shenzhen SEZ
 
Jiang Shek village is located in the Baoan District of the 
Shenzhen SEZ, about 100 km north of Shenzhen city. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe conditions of rural 
families in Gaungdong Province. A better understanding of 
private enterprises in south China, requires one to have an 
idea of how rural  life  has changed and how private 
enterprises are intermeshed within the village unit. 
Jiang Shek village has grown from a shabby town into a manufacturing base for 
many Hong Kong entrepreneurs, according to Mr. Mak, the recently retired Party 
Secretary of the village. Pointing to the main road by which the village was connected 
with other villages in the region, Mak said: 
In 1979, our village had one truck which was enough to carry about thirty 
passengers daily. But in 1992, our village has more than twenty buses. 
About ten buses are publicly owned, another ten are owned by private 
companies to make money. We also have ten more taxis to cope with the 
increased demand from passengers. We plan to widen the road and double 
its size so that it can cope with a flow of 25,000 vehicles daily. 27 
Mak told me Jiang Shek village had forty families with less than two hundred 
people altogether. Before 1979, they were mainly food corps farmers. All the changes 
started in 1990, when the central government gave farmers more freedom for land use and 
even granted loans to them. As a result of economic reform, the village grew rich, from 
having only three black and white televisions in 1979 to 95 percent of the households 
having color televisions in 1992. Mak said. "We no longer need to till the soil. We 
simply can live on income from renting our fields or income from renting our factories." 
Mak continued: 
In 1985, we built one block of factory.  It was half rented and half empty. 
In 1986, we had three blocks of factory. All were owned by Hong Kong 
enterprises. From then on each year we added another two to three blocks 
of factory. By now, 1992, we have about twenty five blocks of factories. 
Most of them owned by Hong Kong businessmen and some are for the 
Taiwanese. 
All of Mr. Mak's family fields had been turned into factory sites, and the family no 
longer tills the soil. Their fields were sold for $6,000 per moue and the proceeds were 
equally spilt between the government and the family. The income greatly improved his 
family's standard of living. Mak said: 
Farmers are very entrepreneurial nowadays. We use some money to 
improve our standard of living and other money to invest collectively. We 
gather together to build factories. We also grow cash crops and raise 
chicken together-- we have a chicken farm and fruit orchids. We do these 
to make profits by selling to big corporations. These big corporations have 
thousands of employees who demand mango and lichee. 
One mou is approximately equal to 6.67 acres. 28 
With plenty of money, the family built a comfortable three-story house where Mr. 
and Mrs. Mak stayed most of the time. The house had two color television sets, one 
Panasonic Hi-fi stereo system with two amplifiers, one Panasonic video set, one Japanese 
refrigerator, and a set of Western-design sofa. Judging by Mak's living room, I would 
say his standard of living was comparable to a medium-to-low-income household in Hong 
Kong. 
Mak told me his eldest son worked in the village for a Hong Kong-owned factory 
as the General Manager representing the Chinese government. He explained Chinese law 
stipulates that each foreign enterprise has to hire a local Chinese as General Manager to 
represent the Chinese government. His son made RMB3503 a month. His elder daughter 
married a Hong Kong worker and was applying for her residency in Hong Kong. Her 
husband stayed with her once a week and gave her 1-11($2,0004 a month. "She plays 
mahjong and does nothing." Mak said. 
Having a Customs License, his younger daughter made as much as RMB2,000 a 
month. She enjoyed shopping, especially for brand name fashions. Mak commented: 
We have to have connections to get our daughter a license. We have to 
know friends to get an application form first and then she has to pass an 
examination. My daughter failed the first time but that was not a problem. 
She invited test officials to karaoke and dinner, then studied for another 
week and passed. She is now charging RMB100 to RMB300 helping 
Hong Kong enterprises to clear customs. This is a good way to make 
money and she makes lots of money. 
3 In 1992, US$1 was approximately worth RMB5.5. 
4 Hong Kong has a fix exchange rate with US$1 to HK$7.73. 29 
Mak finally decided to send his youngest son to join the People's Liberation Army 
at Hunan in June 1991 to discipline him and stop him from turning bad. However her 
younger sister strongly objected because he could earn very little money -- RMB100 per 
month. Mak was the household head who ultimately made all decisions, but because his 
younger daughter made a lot of money, "She has a lot of say when it comes to make 
family decisions." Mak said. "In fact, it was her idea to sent my youngest son to Shenzhen 
in the first place." Mak continued: 
We first sent him to Shenzhen to learn finance, hoping that he could obtain 
a finance license and be able to make good money. We paid RMB700 for 
his tuition and gave him RMB1,000 per month for living expenses. But he 
didn't study and spent money on buying clothes. We then wanted him to 
learn driving because drivers nowadays make lots of money too.  But he 
associated with bad friends and had a girl friend who regularly got into 
trouble. This girl was once beaten up by hoodlums. For revenge, he paid 
money to have someone beat up the hoodlums. The hoodlums were mad 
and seriously beat my son up twice and forced him to pay RMB10,000 in 
compensation. On top of this, we spent RMB5,400 to invite the gang to 
eat in a western restaurant, RMB10,000 to sing at a karaoke, and 
RMB4,000 for additional dinners (RMB1,000 each for 4 times). We ended 
up spending up to RMB30,000 to just keep him out of trouble. We don't 
want him to go to Shenzhen anymore, we just want him to be good and 
safe. 
These hoodlums wore brand-name fashions, wide hand chains and expensive 
clothes up to RMB800 a shirt. Mak commented: 
Life has improved a lot, more than ten fold since 1979. Nowadays, 
Guangdong farmers just don't need to farm anymore. All the people you 
see out there working in the field are employed from other provinces; they 
till the soil for us. I tell you this, I could just sit here and live on the rents I 
collect from the fields and the factories. 
As we concluded our conservation, Mak told me the village plan for 1992: 30 
Other villages have already built resorts and hotels to attract tourism, and 
we are not going to lag behind. We plan to build a twenty-five story 
complex with banks, restaurants and shops on the lower floors and 
commercial offices on the higher floors. We also plan to build a three-star 
hotel, an entertainment center with shopping mall, and an effective highway 
to link us with the outside world. 
I was impressed with what had happened economically in Jiang Shek village, 
Guangdong. I was amazed with what would be happening in the future. On my way back 
to Yuen Fung Factory where I lived in the dormitory with managers and workers, my 
passing thought was to buy some of the village's properties at a low price and sell at a 
high price a few years later to make profits. My optimism was immediately turned off 
when I came to a local school which looked very depressing to me. 
Analysis :
 
Jiang Shek Village, Guangdong Province
 
Jiang Shek village, liked many other rural villages, turned their fields into industrial 
land following Deng's economic reforms in the early 1980s. This greatly improved rural 
families' standard of living. Other improvements included the development of 
infrastructure, property, banking, commerce, and tourism. 
Robust economic growth, however, undermined the rural way of life. New values 
-- entrepreneurial and capitalistic values had replaced the old value placed on hard 
working. Farmers no longer till their soil and Mak's daughter plays mahjong and does 
nothing. 31 
In the old days, Chinese people looked down upon merchants because they did not 
produce; they merely provided a service for goods exchange. The Chinese had no concept 
of service, but emphasized obligations instead. The traditional social rankings from top to 
bottom were: intellectual, farmer, worker, and merchant. New values have turned Chinese 
social rankings upside down. Now, merchants rank first and intellectuals rank last. This 
explained why Mak never thought of sending his son to college. Going to school did not 
allow making money, and Mak wanted his son to learn driving to make lots of money. 
Chinese youngsters embrace new values such as: fashion consciousness, 
materialism, and money-orientation. For them money means power, that is having lots of 
influence in the family. The old Chinese way of life -- hard work -- is no longer embraced 
by youngsters. 
Case Study : 
Yuen Fung Factory
 
The Cheungs', Board of Directors
 
Jiang Shek Village, Baoan District, Shenzhen SEZ
 
This case study depicts how small Chinese family-style 
business is run in a suburb of the SEZ. Yuen Fung Factory 
employees fifty workers and is located at Jiang Shek village 
of Baoan District, about 100 km north of Shenzhen City. 
Yuen Fung Factory exemplifies the traditional Chinese 
management characteristics of familism, paternalism, and 
personalism. 32 
Yuen Fung Company was located in one of the twenty-five blocks of factory space 
owned by Mak and his fellow villagers. Yuen Fung was first founded by the Cheung 
family, including three brothers and three sisters, in 1984 at Kwai Chung, Hong Kong. In 
1989, the Cheungs' seriously made plans to move their factory to the mainland to take 
advantage of cheap land and labor. They changed their plans temporarily because of event 
in Tiananmen Square, but eventually moved to Jiang Shek Village because they had 
friends there. Tung, the second eldest brother explained that the family bought the 
existing factory building, hired fifty workers, installed twenty machines and started their 
business. Everything went smoothly except that they found dealing with Chinese Customs 
and local authorities to be a painful process. Tung said: 
None of us likes to deal with the Chinese local authorities, but whether or 
not we like it, it is a very important job that we have to put up with. 
Tung was the President of the company and was the one to deal with local 
authorities. He was incharge of marketing and sales. During my brief stay in the factory, I 
often found him talking on the phone, taking a long lunch, visiting in the village. He went 
to karaoke bars three to four times a week. I also saw him hang around the production 
area to fix old machines. In dealing with local authorities, Tung said: 
Money talks and money works. We spend RMB500 to RMB1,000 to hold 
banquets for the Customs department every month. In addition, we give 
RMB100 to RMB200 to each Customs official and RMB200 to 300 to 
senior Customs officials. We also have to give money to the Public 
Security Bureau, Village Committee, and local gangsters each month. 
During the Spring Festival, we pass out another RMB2,000 for cigarettes 
and X0 cognac. 33 
Wing was the eldest brother among the six siblings in Hong Kong. He was in-
charge of internal affairs and production. Wing said: 
Electricity is a big problem we have to face. There are regular black-outs 
in the village and we have to install an emergency generator for backup 
electricity. We also have to hire an electrician to maintain the emergency 
power generation system. This electrician costs us twice as much as an 
ordinary production worker. But, this is the amount of money we have to 
pay. 
Telecommunication such as telephone and fax were in great demand and the cost 
was outrageous. I saw the company hide their fax machine inside a drawer. Wing 
explained that they would rather risk being discovered using a stolen telephone line for the 
fax machine than paying an installation fee of RMB10,000 up front. "We were discovered 
twice last year and simply paid a bribe of RMB200 each time. This is far more 
economical." Wing said and continued: 
We paid RMB4,000 for telephone installation and paid RMB1,500 for the 
application fee. When we first applied for a telephone line, we filed an 
application, waited for one month and got no response. We wizened up 
and sent a gift, then got a response in one week. There was no official 
record kept for phone calls. We paid whatever the telephone office wished 
to charge.  The average bill we got was RMB1,800 a month. The most 
expensive bill was RMB2,850, and the cheapest bill was RMB700. We 
could pay ten dollars and request an official record, but this would ruin 
personal relations. We did check our telephone bill once. The telephone 
bill was just outrageous! 
Every three months, the company had to apply for a work permit for each worker. 
The company had fifty workers and the permit fee was RMB30 per person. The total fee 34 
should have been RMB1,500. However, "They charged us RMB1,500 the first time, and 
the second and the third time just charged us half -- RMB750 instead of RMB1,500. We 
just don't know how much they are going to charge us next time. They usually charge 
less.  It all depends on how good your relations are with them." Wing said. 
Nan was the youngest brother. He ran his own business in China. Though busy, 
he came to the factory during week-ends when his brothers went back Hong Kong. Nan 
had nothing to do in the factory but just came every week-end. He also attended the 
Board of Director's meetings. "This is a family business and I have to be involved." Nan 
said. 
Mei, the oldest sister worked in the Hong Kong office. She was in-charge of 
accounting and did her work mainly in Hong Kong. I never saw her in the factory. The 
other two sisters, Chun and Fong, were homemakers in Hong Kong, but came to the 
factory twice a month and stayed for about three to four days. Chun said: 
We have to come. Our brothers are men; they only know production and 
sales. They don't know anything about management and they don't know 
how to train the girls. These girls don't know anything; they are from the 
village, uneducated, and stupid. They need training. We come here to 
watch these girls work and select a few to train. You see `Ah Lan' -- she is 
quick and smart, a high school graduate from Guangdong province. She is 
different so we trained her and promoted her to supervisor. 
On one occasion, while Chun wrapped a bandage around a female worker's 
bleeding finger, she said "You're so stupid.  I showed you how to use a cutter, but you 
cut yourself" 
Chun also said her brother, Tung was stupid. Tung promoted two girls to be 
quality control supervisors. Chun disagreed, demoted the two girls back to their original 35 
post, and selected and trained new girls instead. Besides training, the two sisters also 
helped take care of household chores in the factory. For instance, when the cook cut 
herself, had four stitches, and could not work for a week, I saw the two sisters spend 
hours in the kitchen preparing meals for the fifty workers. While one sister carefully 
washed a huge basket of vegetables, the other sliced chunks of meat into pieces. Two 
girls from the production line were transferred to help with other kitchen work such as 
washing dishes and making tea. 
The first time I met Hui Ning was in her office. Hui Ning spoke Cantonese with a 
distinct northern Chinese accent. She did not share the Cheung family name. A computer 
was placed on her desk and a safe was placed behind her. Hui Ning occupied one of the 
three office desks in the air-conditioned office. Hui Ning was introduced to me as their 
niece, but Chun told me later: 
She is not exactly our niece. She is the daughter of our eldest brother's 
second wife. She earned a degree in Tianjin and wanted to come down 
south. Everyone wants to come to southern China now, for a well paid 
job, shopping malls, and everything. She is lucky to have us here. We pay 
her well and give her this job so she can stay in Shenzhen. Everyone wants 
to come to Shenzhen. This is a place to make good money. 
Hui Ning did everything, except production and engineering. She performed 
mainly administrative and secretarial work. She did bookkeeping, kept personnel records, 
calculated wages, recorded leaves, wrote up factory regulations, ensured that the 
dormitory and toilet were clean etc. She was in-charge of the two cooks and one driver.  I 
once saw her do production work just like other women workers. 36 
Hui Ning said she worked from morning till night and was not satisfied with her 
pay. I encouraged her to talk directly to management and asked for a raise. She said: 
I don't need to bring this up myself; they should know it. I have been here 
more than a year. I get up at 7:00 a.m. and don't slow down until after 
6:00 p.m. I have dinner then work more in the office. I have a lot to do 
and they pay me RMB500. Other Hong Kong people get HK$5,000 or 
more doing the same job as I do. They say I am their niece but I know 
they don't really treat me as a niece. I am not exactly their niece anyway. 
They are Hong Kong people and they are businessmen .  They should give 
me a raise and they should just know this. 
Ah Kai was from Hong Kong and earned HK$12,000 per month. Kai did not 
belong to the Cheung family, but was Head of the Engineering Department. Kai's brother 
loaned HK$200,000 to the Cheung to help set up the factory due to long-term friendship. 
Kai said: 
We have four apprentices, two engineers and good machines here. 
Workers can learn better here because we use better machines. Our 
machines are made in West Germany. They are a bit old, but much better 
than the Chinese made ones. Workers learn to use western machines and 
learn Hong Kong techniques. Workers benefit more and this is good for 
their future. 
Ah Kai and Hui Ning were boyfriend and girlfriend, both were twenty-four years 
old. They usually chatted till midnight after work. Tung once told me that he got up at 
2:00 a.m. to check whether his workers went to sleep and discovered Kai and Hui Ning in 
the backyard. He was very upset and scolded them severely. Since Kai and Hui Ning 
were in management positions, by staying up late, he thought they would bring bad 37 
influence to workers. "Managers should set good examples." Tung said. Chun agreed 
and added: 
As managers, we have to take care of tiny things, not letting our employees 
stay up late. This will affect their performance. How can they work if they 
go to sleep late. We do not allow our workers go out of the factory after 
11:00 p.m. We lock all the doors. It is not safe after dark. Robbery and 
rape are rampant. We have to make sure our workers are safe. How are 
we going to face their parents if their daughters get hurt? 
In terms of safety, I found the practice of locking all doors and sealed all windows 
extremely unsafe. Only Hui Ning, the sixty-five-year-old doorman, Tung and Wing had 
keys. They had a bundle of keys, all tied together. I wondered how they could locate the 
correct key in case of fire. There were only six medium-size extinguishers in the factory 
located at the two ends of each floor. The factory stored highly flammable materials -­
plastic at the top floor. Tung said: 
We have to be very careful about fire.  I have more than HK$300,000 of 
materials here.  I bought fire insurance for this factory so it would be 
protected even if the worst happened. We have fire extinguishers. The 
Local Safety Bureau inspected us and had no complaint. 
A tragic fire happened in the next village where sixteen workers were burned to 
death. Tung heard the news in the morning, took the leadership and held an emergency 
meeting for the whole factory that evening. He taught workers basic knowledge in case of 
fire and had all workers rehearse for an accidental fire. 
This rehearsal brought all management and employees together for two hours. 
I saw them laugh and make fun of each other. I was happy for them. 38 
Interview : 
Management Belief System
 
Fat, Family Business Owner
 
Jiang Shek Village, Baoan District, Shenzhen SEZ
 
The purpose of this  interview  is  to  understand  the 
manager's belief system about workers. Fat owns a small 
factory in the Jiang Shek village, Guangdong. He is the sole 
proprietor of his company.  I had interviewed other 
managers asking the same questions but what I found in Fat 
were the most comprehensive.  This case is an example of 
the belief system  I  found among managers of small 
enterprises.  Managers view workers as naturally lazy, 
needing to be pushed, needing to be watched at all times, 
and needing direction and supervision.  They believed 
workers had no creativity, no initiative and only worked for 
money. 
Fat said workers were by nature lazy and they needed a push.  Fat also believes 
that workers had no initiative and had to be monitored at all times to produce. Otherwise, 
workers did not do anything. "You just have to watch them to make sure they work and 
work correctly." Fat said. 
"Workers absolutely work for money, work for themselves. Who's going to care 
about the community anyway, not to mention the nation. Nowadays, people talk about 39 
themselves, they care less about others. No one cares for the country, they care for 
money." Fat continued. 
He believes workers are stupid and must be instructed. He said workers are from 
the village, poor, and have no education. Consequently "Workers need instruction in 
everything single step." Fat said. 
Fat allowed workers no freedom, nor would he allow workers to use their own 
judgment at work. He paid workers RMB7.00 per hour, one dollar less than other 
enterprises paid their workers.. 
Though he said workers were lazy and stupid, he believes Chinese, like people in 
Hong Kong and in the United States, are efficient, if you know how to deal with them. 
While everyone I talked to complained about Chinese customs authorities, he said 
"I can talk to my friends at Customs at 2:00 p.m. and clear HK$300,000 worth of imports 
at 4:00 p.m." Most people, however, have to wait for a month just to import one 
machine. 
When selecting a place to establish his business, Fat first went to the village head 
and chatted with him. Hong Kong people can do business in China because they know 
how to go behind closed doors. Taiwanese do not do as well. Some Taiwanese have to 
wait for half a year to clear customs. "Taiwanese are not efficient in this sense, they do 
not know how to get around." he said. 
If Fat kept his factory in Hong Kong, it would have cost him at least 20 percent 
more than his operation in China. Hong Kong workers were becoming very expensive. 
An average Hong Kong laborer cost HK$8,000 per month compared to RMB600 per 40 
month for a Chinese worker. Fat spent HK$80,000 for ten workers in Hong Kong and 
only RMB150,000 for all his expenditure in China. 
Fat said Deng's opening up of South China brought money to the North. Workers 
from North China sent money to the North. South China was getting rich and helping the 
poorer North China. Deng's policies also had brought pretty women from the North as 
prostitutes to the South. 
Fat claimed to be a money maniac and explained that money making was a way of 
life. He said he helped the poor in making a living as well. He paid workers RMB7.00 
per hour and did not agree with me that he was exploiting them. Fat said: 
Some pay RMB6.00 per hour. Some pay RMB7.00 or RMB8.00 an hour. 
All capitalists on earth have to "exploit" workers and you just cannot not 
"exploit" them because the structure is fixed. If I pay workers more, I will 
cause other owners to pay more. 
When he was sixteen and worked as an apprentice, He said he was being exploited 
as well. He only made HK$16 a month for the first year, HK$18 for the second year and 
HK$22 for the third year. He was very unhappy and no one cared. Fat said: 
I had to finish all work and clean my master's laundry, buy him cigarettes 
etc. Nowadays workers have a much easier time. Exploitation has been 
around for ages and it is in the structure and no one can change it. 
According to Fat, in order to manage, one had to watch workers closely, scold 
them and push them. To decrease waste, one had to deduct from their salaries. He felt 
that the way China's state-owned enterprises and businesses ran were a waste of time and 
a waste of money. 41 
Analysis :
 
Chinese Family Business in Rural Area
 
Yuen Fung Factory demonstrated a typical Chinese family-style enterprise. Chinese 
family organization shared three general features: familism, personalism, and paternalism. 
Familism is evident where only family members are given positions on Board of 
Directors, as shareholders, and in senior management positions. The traditional Chinese 
family business organization trusts only family members or kin. In the case of Yuen Fung 
Factory, the Board of Directors included the three brothers and three sisters. Nan had 
nothing to do in the factory but "to come and be involved" simply because "this is a family 
business". Hui Ning was in an ambiguous situation. She was not really the family 
member, nor was she a non-family member. She had been with the company for one year, 
given time, she might gradually gain trust and became more important in the factory. 
Paternalism is evident where there is a father-figure at the core in a hierarchical 
structure with centralized power. In traditional Chinese family business organization the 
proprietor expects staff loyalty in exchange for his benevolence. Tung, the sole proprietor 
of Yuen Fung factory, was the father-figure, was respected by all, and had absolute power 
in the factory. Chun trained all employees and did not allow women workers to go out at 
night, acting as a surrogate mother-figure who cared and nurtured her children. "How are 
we going to tell their parents if they get hurt in our factory," she said. Tung, too, cared 
about his children. He got up at 2:00 a.m. and checked whether all workers had gone to 
sleep. After hearing about the fire accident, Tung led the whole organization and 42 
immediately held a fire rehearsal. Though Wing was in-charge of production, Tung 
helped. Tung and Wing instructed and urged workers to produce; they were the 
authorities in the factory. China is a hierarchical society, and workers naturally respect 
authority. Thus, workers highly respected the two brothers. This was in contrast to the 
two sisters and Hui Ning. They had to perform petty tasks such as cooking meals for fifty 
workers when the chef was not able to work. Power distribution in Yuen Fung was highly 
vertical and centralized. Power was shared only among family members headed by Tung. 
Since Hui Ning was not really a family member, she had no power. 
Personalism is evident in placing high value on human relationships. Having 
interpersonal skill to cultivate "guanxi" (connections) externally and to establish rapport 
with community leaders is crucial. Tung spent most of his time talking on the phone, 
taking a long lunch, visiting in the village, and going to karaoke bars three to four times a 
week. He moved to Jiang Shek village to be around friends. Every month and on special 
occasions, Tung had to give money or sent gifts to local authorities to cultivate "guanxi ". 
As a result, the Local Labor Bureau successively reduced its charges. How much they 
charged completely depended on the quality of their relationships. Having good "guanxi" 
with the Customs, Fat could clear $300,000 imports in two hours while others had to wait 
a month to just import one machine. It was not what you know but who you know in 
China that makes business successful. This also explains how Fat selected a place for his 
factory. The first thing he did was to chat with the village head. Personalism, a means of 
establishing external rapport, is always important for a Chinese family business to succeed. 43 
Other common features found in Chinese family business organization were loose 
structure, lack of planning, mistrust of non-family members, and management acting in an 
ad hoc manner. The Yuen Fung factory had no organizational chart and no job 
descriptions, simply because workers just fit in. The two sisters and Hui Ning were 
generalists who had to do almost everything. 
Paternalism and Familism are the two major weaknesses in Chinese family 
organization (Redding 1994:23). Tung gripped tightly onto power and was the sole 
commander of the organization. This resulted in dependence and less of creativity among 
workers, who needed directions at all times. My interview with Fat revealed these 
weaknesses. The tight control only allowing family members to hold key positions was 
explained by Redding as insecurity. Tung was insecure and did not trust anyone or 
delegate anything to anyone except family members. This factor would undermine the 
opportunity for company to grow beyond fifty employees. The only new concept I found 
Yuen Fung had adopted was the importance of quality control. 
Many Chinese business organization started like Yuen Fung factory, founded by 
family members in a small village -- a relatively secure environment, not affected by 
external cultural influences. Thus, Chinese family business organization in such an 
environment is strongly retains the features of familism, paternalism, and personalism and 
the potential for greater modern contributions and company growth remain limited. 44 
CHAPTER 5
 
MEDIUM-SIZE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
 
Interview : 
Tung Fung Manufacturing Company Limited
 
Mr. Kao, General Manager, Hong Kong Representative
 
Shenzhen, SEZ
 
The purpose of this case is to shed light on how medium-
size enterprises in the SEZ areas have partially adopted 
western  management  concepts  and  partially  retained 
traditional  Chinese management values.  Tung Fung 
company employs six hundred workers, and is located in the 
Shenzhen city center nearby the Shenzhen airport.  I 
interviewed three managers in this company. 
As I stepped into Tung Fung's office, I was impressed by the plaques hanging on 
the wall. The company had won fourteen national awards -- for quality control, best 
performance for the year, etc. On the other side of the wall hung a huge organizational 
chart. I was led into a conference room where I could see clearly four separate rooms 
representing: Administration and Personnel, Finance, Marketing and Sales, and 
Engineering departments. 
Tung Fung, a Hong Kong company, moved to Shenzhen in 1984 to take advantage 
of cheap labor and land. It was a medium-size company with six hundred employees. 45 
The company placed Mr. Kao in Shenzhen as General Manager representing the Hong 
Kong managers. Born in China, where he graduated from high school, Kao moved to 
Hong Kong at age sixteen. 
The first assignment Kao had was to improve the quality control. Kao said: 
Our company takes a three step approach to improving our products in 
order to be competitive. First, we aim at meeting the International 
Standard 90005. Up to the end of 1991, only two Hong Kong companies 
had met this standard. We want to meet this international standard too. 
Second, we organize internal training courses among workers. All 
workers, from junior staff to general manager, must know the company 
products well. I prepare training guidelines and instruct engineers to teach 
workers about company products. Third, we send workers to the 
Shenzhen Quality Control Test Center and they have to pass the test. Our 
workers have to meet the national standard. 
According to Kao, the company has improved its quality control dramatically and 
has reduced its reject rate from five times a month down to once or twice a month. 
Kao's second assignment was to improve production. Kao believes the 
Engineering Department should work with the production team to ensure normal 
production. He believes if all production machinery is well maintained, production will 
increase. Kao required both production and engineering managers to be responsible for 
production. Consequently, the company increased production and profit. 
Figure 1. Tung Fung Company Annual Sales and Profits from 1985 to 1992 
Year  # of Workers  Wages in RMB  # of Sales  Profit in RMB 
1985  064  $162  89.7  46.5 
1986  144  $185  613.6  337 
1987  204  $275  1,237  560 
5 IS9000 is approved by the European Common Market and is equivalent to the American standard. 46 
Figure 1. Continue 
Year  # of Workers  Wages in RMB  # of Sales  Profit in RMB 
1988  286  $370  2,231.6  538 
1989  242  $435  2,258  558 
1990  265  $469  2,232  560 
1991  247  $541  2,132  707 
1992 up to June  260  $591  271 
Kao believes a good company needs good employees. He said: 
We only hire university graduates or seasoned veterans as senior staff. We 
value quality control and hire only university graduates for the department. 
Engineers have to be university graduates too. They have to pass our 
mathematics test. Our workers mostly are high school graduates. We 
believe a good company needs good workers. 
Kao said the company did not want to fire employees but would switch unfit 
employees to different departments and allow them a three month probation: 
Once we hire a worker, we don't want that person to leave. 
We will do whatever we can to help. We set targets for 
workers and find out why they cannot meet them. We 
discuss problems with them and train them. We value their 
sense of belonging and want them to feel they are a part of 
us. 
Kao believes a good company treats its employees well and trains them well. He 
said his utmost wish is to bring out workers' potential. 47 
Interview :
 
Mr. Sum, General Manager, China Representative
 
A month after my interview with Kao, he took me to his Shenzhen factory. He 
introduced me to Mr. Sum, General Manager (China Representative). Sum was in his 
early fifties. His demeanor made me feel that he was a Chinese official. Sum started our 
conversation about Deng's economic reforms: 
When I first came to Shenzhen in 1981, there were not many electrical 
appliances and people were not rich. Ever since Deng's reforms, China has 
changed. Some people were helped and got rich. Others were sacrificed 
and remained poor. Deng Xiaoping wants us to reform. Deng encourages 
us to be experimental and not be afraid to make mistakes. 
Kao told me there have been many changes since Deng's reforms, changes in the 
factory as well. He said: 
The 'Iron Rice Bowl'' system has been replaced by the 'Responsibility' 
system'. The new 'Responsibility' system is based on workers' 
productivity. The harder they work, the more they earn. The longer hours 
they work, the more money they get. Workers gladly work overtime for 
more money. I think this is very entrepreneurial, and this entrepreneur 
spirit is spreading around China. 
Though central government began to encourage enterprises to fire employees, 
Tung Fung company, like Japan, still embraces life-time employment because Japanese 
employment is more personalistic than the Western counterparts, Sum said: 
6 It means job guaranteed for life.
 
'It is like a contract system where a contractee is fully responsible for gains and losses.
 48 
Central government encourages companies to fire workers if they are not 
good; and vice versa. As a result of this, we now can enjoy free flow of 
labor. However, our company, like Japan, has life-time employment. But 
many enterprises are unlike us; they fire people. China has become just like 
other Western societies: people have to work for success. 
Kao said the company's philosophy was to treat employees well. The company 
organized karaoke singing contests, swimming competitions, and picnics. "All these 
activities are to improve worker relations." Kao said. 
It seems to me that the company's time card system was quite contrary to the 
company philosophy. Sum explained that the time card system was designed for workers 
from the village, not workers from the city. Sum said: 
We cannot treat village workers too nicely because we are afraid that if we 
treat them too nicely, they would not appreciate it and would not follow 
our instructions. We want workers to produce more and we believe we 
have to push them. We particularly set strict rules for woman workers 
from the village. They are not allowed to go out of the factory late at 
night. These village girls are simple-minded and are easily tempted by bad 
people to become prostitutes. We have to set rules preventing them from 
making mistakes. We also have to guide them with good moral standards 
to protect them. These girls just have to follow our rules and follow our 
clock to know when they should go to bed and when should go to work. 
We do not want them to go out late. Staying out late will affect their work 
performance. 
When Sum finished talking with me, he introduced me to two women supervisors. 
We chatted for forty minutes and this helped me to complete my understanding of 
management's beliefs about workers. 49 
Interview : 
Management Belief System
 
Mr. Chan, Production Manager
 
I understood I had to treat Mr. Sum to a decent dinner to 
thank him for giving up his time.  It was during dinner that I 
met Mr. Chan. We had a three-hour chat.  I found Chan's 
management belief similar to those of the other two women 
supervisors, except that his belief was stronger. 
Mr. Chan had been with the company for four years. He spoke good Cantonese 
and was from Guangdong. He was twenty-five years old and took evening courses in 
Industrial Enterprise Management at Shenzhen Television Broadcast University, a 
prominent local university. 
Chan strongly believes in human nature. He said: 
I believe strongly that workers are naturally active, aspire to work, and will 
appreciate being treated with courtesy. I also believe they work to achieve 
goals, are self-directed, creative, and constantly grow through work. Some 
workers have little concern beyond their immediate interests. Some 
workers work for money, but not all. Workers are not lazy. Only some 
need to be watched closely to perform. I think workers are basically good. 
Though he believes workers are basically good, Chan also believe they need 
direction and instruction. They fit into predefined jobs and prefer not to deal with 
problems themselves. Chan explained that workers are usually middle to high school 
graduates. They do not have a good education. 50 
I found two of Chan's colleagues also shared with him a similar set of beliefs about 
workers, but they differed greatly on whether workers were naturally lazy or not. Mr. 
Chan absolutely disagreed that workers were lazy by nature, whereas his colleagues 
thought that to a certain extent workers were naturally lazy. They also differed as to 
whether workers appreciate courtesy. Chan strongly believes if you treat workers with 
respect, they respect you in return. However, his colleagues disagreed with him 
suggesting that managers should keep their distance from workers; otherwise, workers 
will not be afraid of management and management will not be able to make them work. 
Regarding the role of management in seeking to increase productivity, decrease 
waste, increase incentives and decrease absenteeism, Chan said: 
The key to managing is to understand, to assist, and to have good 
relationship with workers. To increase productivity is to introduce an 
effective method to workers. A good method together with high morale in 
an organization are conducive to create an effective environment. To 
improve quality, managers have to strengthen the quality control system 
and improve workers' product knowledge. Besides, workers have to meet 
up to standards themselves. Managers also have to be instinctive to be able 
to spot problems. Prevention is better than cure. 
Chan discussed problems with workers directly on the job, not at meetings. He 
concluded: 
I learn management techniques both at work and in school. I believe 
people-oriented management works better in our society. We cannot copy 
western management. We have to think about what suits us and what does 
not. 51 
Interview : 
Wun Tai Manufacturing Company Limited
 
Mr. Tsang, Vice President
 
Xiamen, SEZ
 
This  interview  outlines  the  philosophy  of  Chinese 
management based on familism and Confucianism. We see 
how cultural values are deeply ingrained  in  Chinese 
management techniques. Wun Tai employs eight hundred 
employees.  It is located in Xiamen city.  It is a model 
factory in Xiamen SEZ. 
The company secretary was selected to be hired among five thousand applicants all 
over China. The secretary spoke perfect Mandarin, good English and fluent Cantonese. 
As me toured around the building, the secretary indicated that she will go to Hong Kong 
for six months training. The Inventory and Material Supply departments were 
impressively organized. The cafeteria was clean and had televisions and karaokes. The 
company organizational chart hung on a wall along with the company motto saying "We 
should serve our people and serve our nation". 
This telephone manufacturing company had sales throughout West Europe, South 
East Asia, America and Canada. Sales reached US$1.45 billion in 1992. 
Mr. Tsang's brother is a successful Hong Kong businessman who founded this 52 
company. Just as in many other mainland joint ventures, he hired a Chinese citizen -- in 
this case his brother  to be fully incharge of the business. Tsang, Vice President of the 
company, stated: 
Our company suffered its worst period after June 4th, 1989. Many orders 
were canceled. For two months, the company had no work. Workers 
banded together and out of their good will they requested a reduction of 
salary. We declined their offer. 
According to Tsang, the company embraced what it called "moral and spirit" 
education: 
We believe in being good people, morally good with righteousness, 
compassion, integrity and spirit. Having escaped from near death three 
times, I strongly believe the values of human existence. The fundamental 
principal for human existence is the fulfillment of love and happiness. The 
human body itself needs affection. So you see, one of the basic human 
needs is affection. Needs differ from person to person and change over 
time. For example, some people need to gamble, need to smoke, or need 
to see a prostitute. Others need cars, money, or two or more wives. All 
kind of needs have to be satisfied. We intend to help our workers to meet 
their basic needs. We first help them to have a comfortable home. We 
then educate them with 'morals and spirit' to go beyond just fulfilling basic 
human needs to reach a higher ground. We seek a better whole for our 
organization, our community, and our nation. 
Tsang felt that China's problem was that it de-valued individuals and sacrificed 
their human rights. Although the basic goal was to maximum benefit for the working 
class, the way they tried to achieve it just made people unhappy, Tsang said: 
The problem with local management is that it seeks to destroy the human 
spirit, thus making workers feel weak, pliable, and compliant to 
management's demands.  In fact, management should uplift workers' 
spirits so that they contribute to our nation through work. I often 
communicate with central government officials to talk about how to build a 
stronger nation through economic growth. I once told them that we can 
build a stronger China by giving more autonomy to local managers, 53 
allowing local enterprises to hire workers freely, adopting the responsibility 
system, adopting the reward and punishment system. I also suggested the 
central government should lead its people by "moral and spirit" education. 
Mr. Tsang visited workers when they were sick. He attended their wedding 
banquets and played Ping-Pong with them. He treated his workers like family members. 
Tsang said that China is a strong nation and its people do not need to feel inferior. Tsang 
suggested that China could improve itself by adopting management techniques from other 
advanced countries'; however, he though it would be better if China first focuses on 
Confucian "moral and spirit" education. He added: 
We cannot just adopt foreign management from one country. We should 
also learn from Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. We should adopt foreign 
management and fit into Chinese mode. But we should focus on "moral 
and spirit" management and follow the Confucian moral code of behavior. 
Japanese management is like parental management, the company is like a 
family. Workers should feel they are part of the whole production process. 
They should consider the company as their home. Employees work to 
serve our society, to serve our people through work. 
When Tsang concluded discussing his "moral and spirit" education management 
philosophy, he said: "Human beings have spirit and are not mere machines or animals that 
can be confined in a cage. We can contribute a lot when we use our innermost spirit to 
develop our potential. This is meaning of life." 
Tsang continued: "In 1992, our company goals are to increase quality, to offer the 
best service to customers, to be price competitive, and to develop market research. We 
have hired a Japanese person as General Manager in Malaysia to guarantee product 
quality." 54 
Analysis :
 
Medium-Size Business Organization in SEZs
 
Both Tung Fung and Wun Tai Companies are typical of Chinese medium-size 
business organizations located in the SEZs. I found that the three traditional Chinese 
features of familism, paternalism and personalism, had changed to some extent. I found 
that management in the Shenzhen SEZ, a fast-changing environment, experienced more 
changes than its Xiamen counterpart. 
Familism is becoming less important among medium-size enterprises in the SEZs. 
Although Mr. Tsang was a family member of the company, five other managers whom I 
interviewed were not. Senior managers in Tung Fung were no longer family members. 
Mr. Kao was a competent manager who worked his way up in the company. As Sum 
said, "China has become just like other Western societies: people have to work for 
success." Instead of hiring family or kin, Tung Fung hired only university graduates or 
seasoned veterans as senior staff. The secretary of Wun Tai was selected among five 
thousand candidates nationwide. She was not a family member and will be sent for six 
months training in Hong Kong. Not hiring family members, and demanding credentials 
when hiring new employees, indicates a reduction in familism. As these organizations 
grow in size, professionalism is increasingly significant in medium-size business 
organizations in the SEZs. Though familism has receded, it still preserved to some 
degree. The head of Wun Tai placed his brother in a management position. Many other 
Chinese companies have done the same. Thus, I would say that familism is not obsolete. 55 
Familism still has its place and will not go away. Chinese still trust their family members 
more than others and will continue to place them on payrolls, probably, in management 
positions. 
Paternalism is diminishing in medium-size business organizations in the SEZs. The 
importance of the father-figure at the top of the hierarchy is less emphasized. Kao and 
Tsang were both authority figures, but they were not sole proprietors who could 
command and exercise absolute authority like Tung did in a small factory. Instead of 
looking up to authority for an answer, young executives put their faith in an effective 
methods and strong quality control systems to improve the bottom line. Kao delegated his 
power to a production manager and an engineering manager to increase production; thus, 
power was distributed horizontally among different department managers. With a well-
structured organizational chart, with more clearly defined departments and job 
responsibilities, vertical and centralized power is no longer the norm in medium-size 
enterprises in SEZs. However, paternalism remains to same degree. In a hierarchical 
society, like China, workers naturally respect authority. Kao and Tsang were both well-
respected, being seen as leaders of their companies. Management still maintained a 
parental image of caring and benevolence toward their employees. Tung Fung Company 
set rules to restrict women workers from going out at night. The company intended to 
protect women workers from being tempted and making mistakes. In this case, the 
parental authority of the company was strongly retained. Thus, I would say paternalism is 
lessened in a sense that power is horizontally distributed among managers with different 
expertise, but the authority father-figure is still at the top. As the company grows in size, 56 
it is obvious that the organization has to become less paternalistic with more professionals 
to help the sole proprietor handle day-to-day business. 
Personalism is retained in medium-size business organizations in the SEZs. 
Chinese organizations have a life of their own with management as the soul of a human 
enterprise driven by ideology and values. Deeply ingrained in Tsang's "moral and spirit" 
philosophy were strong Chinese roots going all the way back to the Confucian code of 
moral conduct. 
According to Tsang, a morally binding relationship connects all individuals and 
society. This is evident in the company motto "We should serve our people and serve our 
nation". In Confucian doctrine, the state was in essence the super-family of Chinese 
people. Within this structure, social stability was founded on moral prescriptions for 
relationships. Thus, individuals found dignity and harmony within their own social 
context. 
Personalism is also greatly valued by young executives in medium-size enterprises 
in the SEZs. Chan practices personalism internally emphasizing that the key to managing 
is to understand, to assist, and to have a good relationship with employees. He thinks 
people-oriented management works well in China. This explains why Tung Fung 
company does not like to fire workers. The company values their sense of belonging. 
Life-time employment is another morally binding relationship incurring mutual obligations, 
the employer's benevolence on one hand and the employee's loyalty, trust, and 
commitment on the other. The father is obliged to provide his best to the son, and the son 
to carry out his filial piety duties. This explains why workers banded together and 57 
requested a reduction of salary when Wun Tai suffered its worst period after June 4th, 
1989. 
Indeed, Chinese always view a job as a personal relationship. Thus, I would say 
personalism is pervasive in the morally binding relationships in medium-size organizations. 
However, personalism is reduced in the sense that there is not as much dependence on 
"guanxi" to get things done. 
In sum, I found medium-size Chinese enterprises in the SEZ were undergoing 
changes. These enterprises were partially retaining the Chinese characteristics of familism, 
paternalism, and personalism, while partially adopting some Western management 
concepts. 
The new concept of quality control is well accepted in medium-size enterprises in 
the SEZ. Small factories only aim at a decreasing rejection rates, whereas medium-size 
companies strive to meet international standards. I also found more systematically run 
inventory and material supply departments in medium-size companies. All of these 
indicates that Chinese medium-size enterprises are becoming more systematic, organized, 
and structured, like their Western counterparts. 58 
CHAPTER 6
 
LARGE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
Interview : 
Chimney Manufacturing Company
 
Mr. Chang Ji Lu, General Manager
 
Xiamen, SEZ
 
Through China's long history, the history of only a few 
state-owned enterprises have been documented in any 
detail. This chapter attempts to shed light on what is going 
on  in  China's  state-owned  enterprises.  They have 
undergone tremendous changes during the past few years. 
One of the  major change  is  the  adoption  of the 
`responsibility system".  This case provides an example of 
the success of this system.  This case also shows large 
state-owned enterprises are burdened by huge expenditures 
on supporting workers. This company is located in Xiamen 
SEZ.  It is a medium-size state-own enterprise with four 
hundred employees. 
Mr. Chang has worked for other state-owned enterprise for fourteen years. He is 
an engineer with a degree from a technical institute.  The factory building has three stories 
with the top floor was un-occupied. The second floor had five rooms: the director's 59 
room, a meeting room, an accounting room, a personnel room, and a common rest area. 
The inventory room was cluttered with unsold products. Chang said: 
Many state-own enterprises have been losing money for years already. I 
was sent to save this company in December 30, 1990. I first spent half a 
year to get to know the company. To understand production and sales, I 
had heart-to-heart talks with customers and staff.  I then got a bank loan of 
RMB300,000 in June, 1991, and started to make changes. I soon turned 
the company around. 
Chang shown me the company records below. 
Figure 2. Chimney Company Asset from 1971 to 1992 
Year  Asset of the Company 
1971  1,000,000 + 
1979  2,000,000 + 
before 1985  3,700,000 
1986 to 1990  2,000,000 
1991 (reform in June)  5,000,000 
1992 (up to August)  7,200,000 
Between 1986 and 1990, the company was hit hard by inflation, increases in 
material costs and poor sales. Workers made very little money, about RMB50 to RMB80 
a month. The company suffered losses consecutively for five years. Chang started making 
changes in June 1991 and immediately turned the situation around. The company 
continued to make profits. Chang made changes by adopting the responsibility system. 
Chang said: 60 
I first adopted the responsibility system in production. I allowed several 
workers or even the whole production line to be responsible for a contract. 
I make contractors responsible for six objectives: increase quality control, 
decrease material waste, increase productivity, search for market needs, 
increase safety, and increase profits. In adopting the responsibility system, 
I delegated my power to managers who are responsible for the objective. I 
gather all managers to talk. We negotiate over conditions, terms, quotas, 
and goals. All managers have to present monthly reports to me so that I 
can check on them. 
Chang gave me an example of a responsibility contract for safety and said: 
We set our safety standards at one percent for minor injury. We only allow 
four minor injuries among all four hundred employees in a year. We allow 
no major injury so that the company need not pay compensation. Workers 
are responsible for their own injuries and therefore become more concerned 
about safety in their work area. They pay attention to things that are 
unsafe and make necessary changes. 
The responsibility system works such that if workers meet the safety standard, they 
can keep the money given to them in the contract. However, if they cannot meet the 
safety standard, they will have to pay for the cost of injuries. Thus, the responsibility 
system provides a higher incentive for workers to maintain safety standards. Chang said 
that there were no injuries after adopting the responsibility system for safety. However, in 
1989, the company paid RMB300,000 to an injured worker who was twenty-seven years 
old and had two young children. He suffered a fall at the work area and became 
handicapped. 
When Chang first adopted the responsibility system for production, workers dared 
not to take the contract. Chang said: "They were not ready to make a change yet, 
especially a change that made them responsible." But starting in June 1991, "I 61 
commanded them to take the responsibility system. There was no alternative. To assist 
them, I made several changes." Chang continued: 
I first demoted the old production manager to line manager because he is 
so bad. I then transferred a good production manager. To assist this 
manager, I promote a line manager to assistant supervisor and transferred a 
good salesman to work with him. The three of them together with their 
production workers are held responsible for the contract. 
Figure 3. Chimney Company Workers Monthly Income from 1991 to 1992 
Year  Wage Earned 
91/6 and before  $60 to $80 
91/7 
91/8  $300 + 
91/9 to  $400 
91/12  $400 
92/3  $426.62 
92/4  $601.39 
92/6  $436.81 
92/ up to 20 Aug.  $397.2 + 10 working wage 
Chang said the responsibility system for production worked successfully. 
Production workers' earnings increased from less than RMB 100 before June 1991 to 
RMB300 in August 1991. Their earnings continued to increase by 25 percent a month 
until the end of the year. Average workers earned RMB600 in April 1992. The highest 
record for production worker earnings was RMB1,000 per month. The highest for a line 
manager was RMB1,100. 
The result support Chang's statement: "Workers work harder to make more 
money." 62 
To decrease material waste, Chang made a responsibility contract for material 
waste with the head of material supply division. "All materials are procured by material 
supply division now. Workers in the divisions are responsible for meeting supply needs." 
Chang said: 
There is no more material for production this month. Workers have not 
worked for twenty days already. This means they have lost twenty days of 
wages. They now are taking the initiative to ask around and find work to 
do. They go directly to the material department to find out when they will 
have material. They no longer come and ask me. Moreover, they now 
have more concern of material waste than in the past. 
Chang was pleased with the responsibility system and said it was very successful. 
He said: 
The contract system is good because it helps achieve economic goals. It 
connects people of different departments to work together and makes life 
easier for me. For example, Production needs one hundred tons of iron. 
The production contractor will contact planning department which will 
contact supply division which then will contact purchasing division to buy 
materials. When the one hundred tons of iron arrives, the receiving 
division will then make the delivery to production. This allows a good 
flow of horizontal communication among departments. People of different 
departments work together to solve problems. 
Everyone benefited greatly, but Chang felt he benefited the most as a general 
manager. He could free himself from daily routine and moved onto doing other things for 
the enterprise. 
The enterprise was burdened by huge expenses for work benefits, paying for 
retirement and gift expenditures. Chang decided to cut costs. He said: 63 
Each year we pay RMB80,000 in wages and 23 percent of it goes to retired 
workers. We have a retired worker who suffers from liver cancer and one 
who suffers from urine poison. Each of them receives about RMB40,000 a 
month at the most. We pay RMB56,471.96 to the urine poisoned worker. 
The other one cost us RMB23,897.68 from January to September, 1991. 
We have to send gifts to attract customers too. In 1990, one of them 
wanted a color television. I declined this request because we couldn't 
afford it.  1990 was a tough year with poor sales. The customer took 
revenge and stopped doing business with us. We also have to send gifts to 
Chinese officials, e.g., a bucket of fish that you're sure they will never 
finish eating. We have to please them with the sheer volume. We 
sometime have to send gifts to officials' wives too. We send their wives 
high class, imported shoes and Chinese mushrooms, etc. Not a single 
person, including the accountant, knows exactly how much money we have 
spent on gifts. 
Chang said the company definitely had to set a limit on gift expenditures to three 
percent of annual income. Chang was pleased with the responsibility system and was in 
favor of all changes occurring in his enterprise. 
Interview : 
707 Research and Development Center
 
Mr. Wu, Supervisor
 
Tianjin, non-SEZ
 
I lived with Hui Ning and her family for two weeks in 
Tianjin. Her mother worked in a state-owned factory. Mr. 
Wu is a good friend of Hui Ning's mother and had been 
working in the company for seventeen years.  This case 
helps us understand Tianjin's constraints due to bureaucratic 
control from the central government.  This case also sheds 
light on how state-owned enterprises now have more 64 
autonomy to make changes such as conducting market 
research, independently absorbing profits and losses, and 
freedom to hire employees, etc. 
Mr. Wu was the supervisor of the 707 Research and Development Center. The 
company had several thousand employees. Doing business in Shenzhen and Tianjin was 
not the same. Wu said: 
Doing business in Shenzhen is different from doing business in Tianjin. 
Shenzhen enterprises follow the Shenzhen SEZ regulations which allow 
them to enjoy more freedom. However, we [Tianjin enterprises] have 
many constraints from the central government. Unlike people in Shanghai 
and Guangdong, we are conservative. It is because we are closer to 
Beijing. In order to avoid troubles, we act cautiously. Government 
officials are very conservative. When the central government says go 
ahead to do something, we then go ahead. When central says not to do 
something, we then do not go ahead. When the central says nothing, 
Guangdong and Shanghai people go ahead, but we are afraid to do 
anything. We are too conservative. We always lag behind. 
Wu said state-owned enterprises were facing financial problems and estimated 
about 30 percent of them could afford paying full wages to their employees. There was 
not enough work to go around. Inventory was high because of insufficient sales or even 
no sales . Many Enterprises had to change accordingly. 
Wu told me that during the 14th People's Congress, the central government 
suggested increasing enterprise functions and autonomy. These suggestions were 
implemented after June 1991, Wu said: 
We now have more autonomy to deal with foreign affairs. In the past, the 
central government had to approve every investment and project. Now 65 
projects involving less than US$30 million can be approved by local 
government. As a result, enterprises enjoy more direct investment and can 
negotiate directly with foreign investors. 
The central government no longer does planning and budgeting for state-owned 
enterprises. General managers are responsible to plan and make their own budgets. Wu 
said: 
Central government has delegated responsibility to the enterprise general 
manager. Starting from June, 1991, our enterprise made more money. 
We give 75% of profit to central government and share 25% among 
workers as a bonus. We have two thousand workers and each of us 
received a bonus RMB70 to RMB80. 
Wu's enterprise began market research to reduce inventory and better understand 
market needs. Wu said: 
We started diversifying our products in 1985. We conduct market research 
to explore new products. For instance, car ignitions previously were 
imported. When we saw a need in the market, we started to produce car 
ignitions ourselves. Oil well detectors also were imported. Now, we 
manufacture this product. When stealing increased in Tianjin, we started to 
produce alarm systems for security. We have developed fifteen to sixteen 
new products so far averaging two to three new products per year. 
In the past, the central government assigned university graduates to their work 
places. Since June 1991, things have changed. "Now, we can either hire labor or have the 
government assign labor to us; either way is fine. Our enterprise just hired a new worker 
in a junior position. 66 
"Though state-owned enterprises are owned by the government, we now have to 
balance our own profits and losses. The central government no longer subsidizes our 
losses." Wu said. 
Wu was pleased with the economic reforms. He said: 
Economic reforms are good. We have improved our standard of living by 
60 to 70 percent since June, 1991. With free flow of labor, we have more 
opportunities for youngsters and for everyone. More people are willing to 
work in China now instead of escaping to America." 
Interview : 
Sprick Bicycle Manufacturing Company
 
Ms. Tse, Production Worker
 
Ms. Ma, Accountant
 
Mr. Jiang, Salesman
 
Tianjin, non-SEZ
 
This case provides an example of a successful state-owned 
enterprise  under the  decentralization of authority.  The 
enterprise now enjoys more autonomy. It first adopted Western 
technology in 1985 and plans to set up a share-holding system 
in 1992.  This case indicates how state-owned enterprises are 
undergoing drastic changes in accounting, marketing and sales, 
customer services, etc., only the human resources department 
remains unchanged. This enterprise created its own brand name 
bicycle -- Sprick. It is a renowned company in Tianjin city with 
1,200 employees. 67 
Very few state-owned enterprises thrive as much as Sprick. By adopting Western 
technology, Sprick doubled its production. Sprick has several production areas. All areas 
looked clean, spacious, and systematic to me. I was surprised to find a clinic, a huge 
nursery area, and a fleet of buses were all part of the company. I visited the company on 
weekday but I met no production workers. Ms. Tse said: 
Workers finished their contracts earlier so they don't need to come to work 
until they have another contract. For instance, this production line has a 
contract for a month, but workers finished the task three days earlier, so 
workers can have a three day off. Now, workers are much more efficient. 
When she graduated from high school, Tse was assigned by the central 
government as a production worker earning RMB80 a month. Tse explained that in the 
years 1985 and 1986, all high school graduates had to work on the production line for at 
least a year. Jobs were all assigned by the local labor bureau. Proudly introducing me the 
company's production facilities, Tse said: 
Our General Manager had vision. As early as in 1985, he made business 
trips to West Germany to explore opportunities to increase production. 
Back then, companies could not directly sign contracts with foreigners and 
had to go through the Tianjin City Economic and Pubic Affairs Bureau. In 
1988, we introduced second-hand West German technology and started to 
innovate. With Western technology, things can be done much easier. New 
technology allows us to improve auto assembly. It is easier to change 
color and modal, and the finished products do not show crease lines 
between joints. With the new machinery, we can produce twenty-four 
hours non-stop. 68 
As we walked into the finance department, Tse introduced me to Ms. Ma. Ma had 
been with the company for more than ten years. She told me this year the company plans 
to set up share-holding system. She said: 
Among thousands of state-owned enterprises, the central government has 
only allowed twenty enterprises to set up share-holding systems in Tianjin. 
In 1992, our company will set up a share-holding system. We plan to have 
65% of the company shares owned by workers and 35% owned by the 
central government. We also plan to have the general public own some of 
our shares. Once the system is set, I can own some company shares. 
A share-holding system can solve many problems. Ma said: 
With a share-holding system, we can form a board of directors. Decisions 
can be made through the directors, not the central government. We can 
elect key personnel every four years, instead of having key personnel 
assigned by central government. With a share-holding system, we can raise 
investment funds to fulfill needs. With money, we can buy computers to do 
computer aided design. Computers are so remarkable. Computers can add 
color, change color, and draw new products. Nowadays, it's very difficult 
to hire people good at design. We lack this kind of expertise. Computers 
can do the design for us. Computers can help solve this problem. 
The company hung its bicycle in the mid-air in front of the main entrance. I found 
it very innovative. Tse agreed. When I visited the marketing and sales department, Tse 
introduced me to Mr. Jiang, a salesman, who said: 
Our sales department has improved a lot. We now call it our "marketing 
and sales" department. To encourage salesmen to tap new markets, our 
company gives travel and accommodation allowances to salesmen who 
travel outside of Tianjin and outside of China. Our products have sales in 
Asia and Turkey already. But we want to tap new markets such as Hong 
Kong, Japan, Canada and mostly the American market. We have a joint 
venture in Canada. We have just finished a new brochure and company 
catalog. 69 
Figure 4. Sprick Company Monthly Sales Plan from 1991 to 1992 
Month  Sales Plan 
Oct. 1991  Export to Hungary (US$65 / bike) 
Apr 1992  Send 133 sample bikes to Germany 
June 1992  Enter German Market (US$75 / bike) 
Aug. 1992  Send sample bikes to Hong Kong 
Aug. 1992  Send 50 Sample bikes to Japan 
Aug. 1992  Export 682 bikes to Indonesia 
Aug. 1992  Send 14 sample bikes to Canada 
The customer service department was previously called "maintenance" or simply 
"the service department." Ms Tse said: 
Our slogan is: "The Customer is God!" We now pay great attention to 
serving our customers. Our maintenance staff has become more responsive 
to customers. Upon receiving a complaint, we act. When we receive an 
out-of-province order, we assign an agent to extend our services. We have 
newly added several service centers at different regional locations. In 
1988, we had thirty staff in maintenance. In 1992, we have seventy-two 
staff in customer service. Now we value our customers more. 
I saw two computers, two Epson printers, and one abacus in the Finance 
department. The finance department has changed the most compared to other 
departments. Ma said: 
Most of our eleven staff are newly employed and we're required to meet 
professional standards. Ten of us are youngsters and one is in his fifties. 
We have two computers, and we no longer do bookkeeping by hand. 
Many of us are taking an evening course to learn Western accounting. 
Tuition is paid by the company, RMB70 for two months. We go to class 
three times a week and three hours a night. We find Western accounting 
clearer and easier compared to Chinese accounting. We are partially 70 
adopting Western accounting now. We plan to totally change to Western 
accounting in the future. 
The company's canteen is filled not only with employees, but also with their 
spouses and children. I was surprised to find so many children in a work place. The 
company used to pay the canteen RMB20 per worker as a food allowance. This 
guaranteed the canteen business. Workers ate in the canteen regardless of poor service and 
bad taste. Tse said: 
Things have changed now. The company gives the food allowance directly 
to workers and we can choose where to eat. The canteen became an 
independent body separate from our company. It has to manage its own 
profits and losses. Now, the canteen can fix its own price, can attract 
business from outside of the factory, and can do whatever it wants. Now 
we call the canteen a "restaurant" and it runs like a restaurant. It provides 
better service with better food now. It has to improve itself to be 
competitive. 
With more people coming to the restaurant, thefts in the company increased. 
Thus, a new department, the security department, was created. "We now have door 
guards and patrol guards in the company" Tse said. 
It seemed to me that every part of the company was changing, but Tse disagreed: 
One thing that remains unchanged is our human resources department. 
Overall, this hasn't changed. We know that about one-third of our staff are 
redundant, but we still keep them on payroll. We still support a huge 
number of retired workers. We have not fired any employees so far. We 
have to be careful when dealing with people. The whole world talks about 
personal connections here. This is China. 71 
Like other state-owned enterprises, subsidizing a large number of employees 
adds a heavy burden not only to the company, but to the nation as well. "China's problem 
is having too many people", Tse concluded. 
Interview : 
Tianjin Bus Service Company
 
Mr. Ho, Company Secretary
 
Tianjin, non-SEZ
 
This case also demonstrates the success of decentralization 
under China's economic reforms. As more autonomy is  given 
to enterprise managers, they become more creative;  thus, 
company profits increase. 
Mr. Ho was assigned by the central government to work for this company. 
Originally he was a mechanical engineer, but here he was assigned to perform 
administrative work. In 1989, the company still practiced the old iron rice bowl system 
which gave him no incentive to work hard. "I just finish my assignment and that is it," Ho 
said. At that time Ho earned RMB60 to RMB80 per month. 
Like many other state-owned enterprises, Ho's company continued to lose money. 
Then, the central government encouraged enterprises to reform. Quoting Deng Xiaoping, 
Ho said "We have to be braver and we have to take a bigger step forward, without being 
afraid of making mistakes." 
The company started to explore new ways to increase its bottom line in 1990. The 
year of 1992 was the company's best year. Ho said: 72 
Ever since we have been given more autonomy, we set our targets, we 
design our bus routes, we schedule our buses, and we have started to 
make profits gradually. Our best, newest bus can earn RMB200 to 
RMB300 a month and this is a 250 percent within three years. As a direct 
result of doing our own thing, we greatly improve our bottom line and our 
income. Since we know our passengers better than the central government 
does, we can better plan our budget. The central government just does not 
know enough. How can they plan for us? Now, with more autonomy, we 
can do much more. Now, we have increased our bus speed, we have 
educated our passenger by writing slogans in the bus. This year [1992], we 
added a special bus service. This special service is more comfortable. We 
charge more for this service and make more profits. 
Ho concluded that state-owned enterprises were enjoying more autonomy and 
were running their enterprises much better than the central government ran them before. 
Interview : 
Tianjin High School 
Mr. Chu, Store Manager 
Tianjin, non-SEZ 
This case shows the separation of power between the central 
government and the enterprise.  State-owned enterprises are 
becoming more independent, separating from the state.  Each 
enterprise has to balance its profits and losses and can retain 
some of its profits. This results in more incentive to use better 
business practices.  I find this case interesting.  It seems that 
everyone is doing business.  Schools are doing business, and 
even school teachers are doing business too. 73 
Believing that the Chinese will always enjoy food, Mr. Chu, a teacher, opened a 
food store selling biscuits, canned foods and all sort of snacks. He was not doing business 
for himself; he was doing business to save his high school from bankruptcy. 
Since 1986, his school kept losing money. As a teacher he earned RMB200 plus a 
bonus of RMB50 a month. Together with his wife, they made RMB400 a month. Their 
income was not enough to support two children. Children's clothing was expensive, 
ranging from RMB30 to RMB40 per set. A skirt alone cost RMB20 to RMB30. 
From 1987 to 1989, the school assigned him to a new job as a driver. He earned a 
total of RMB230 per month. But he used the car to do his own business, i.e. he drove at 
night and whenever he could helping factories to deliver goods and transfer materials. By 
doing so, Chu made an extra RMB4,000 to RMB5,000 a year. He bought a color 
television set, a refrigerator, and a video set. Chu said: 
In 1989, the school assigned me to open a store to solve its financial 
problems. I figures China is a "food culture" and decided to run a food 
store selling beer, mineral water, canned fish, wine, bread and all sorts of 
snack.  I and two other workers work from 8:30 to 5:00. I made 50 
percent profit in the first year and much more later. 
Figure 5 -- Tianjin High School Profit Earned and their Distribution 
Year  Profit  $ Earn  To Govt.  To School 
1990  Profit  40,000  24,000  16,000 
1991  Profit  60,000  36,000  24,000 
1992 June  Profit  30,000 
Chu told me that everyone in China is doing business nowadays. He said: 74 
Schools are doing business as well. Now our school is 
changing from high school to nursing school to make more 
money. There are too many chemistry teachers in our school. 
Many of them have to change jobs. I am lucky. I am assigned 
to do business, to run this store. 
It seemed to me that everyone is doing business in China. When I was in Tianjin 
for two weeks, I saw many individual entrepreneurs doing business on the street. When I 
took a train to Tianjin, a man just came up to me and talked about his business. I was 
surprised that even a school teacher was doing business, not for himself, but for the 
school. 
Interview : 
707 Research and Development Center 
Mr. Hui, Engineer 
Tianjin, non-SEZ 
Under the policy of economic reform, the central government 
discourages life-time employment. This case sheds light on the 
changes in employment policy.  This state-owned enterprise 
began to give only partial support to its retired workers, and 
partial pay for employees' medical fees.  This case helps us 
understand how the mutual banding between the enterprise and 
its employees is undergoing changes. 75 
Having graduated from a technical institute, Mr. Hui worked at a state-owned 
factory for four years and then quit. His mother helped him to transfer to the 707 
Research and Development Center where every one wanted to work. He was making 
RMB160 a month compared to many other workers in state-owned enterprises who made 
only RMB80 a month. If he worked harder, he could makes more, about RMB200 a 
month. But life was much easier when he was with his old company. Hui said: 
I usually work four to five hours a day and I am considered a very good 
worker. I have twelve public holidays. I can have some "intangible" leaves 
as long as my supervisor agrees.  Such leaves could be to attend a friends' 
wedding, visit relatives in other province, etc. If I'm not feeling well or 
am tired, I can always go home and rest. Those were the old days when I 
was with my old company. 
With this new company, a reputable state-owned enterprise, everything is strict. 
Hui said the company requires a hospital certificate to support sick leave. The company 
only partially pays for workers' medical fees, the amount depending on their seniority. 
Workers are entitled to claim up to 75 percent of their medical expenses if they have been 
working with the company for five to seven years. Workers having ten to twenty years 
with the company can claim up to 80 percent. Workers who have been with the company 
for twenty years or more can claim up to 85 percent. However, in the old days with his 
old company, Hui said "We [workers] were entitled to have full claim on medical fees, 
even if we had just joined the company for a day." 
Hui concluded that state-owned enterprises started economic reforms late. 
"Though the reforms started in 1979, it was not until 1990 that we started to break the 76 
iron rice bowl system and adopt the responsibility system. We now work longer and 
harder to earn more money." 
Analysis :
 
Chinese State-owned Enterprise
 
Based on the limited cases in my study, I found that the three characteristics of 
familism, paternalism, and personalism, are changing in the midst of economic reforms. I 
found familism not to be an issue. I found paternalism has been modified by the 
decentralization of authority. I found that personalism has been retained in the sense that 
human relations are always important in Chinese society. 
Familism is not a theme traditionally in China's state-owned enterprises; thus, there 
has been no change. Although Mao attacked Confucianism, his party organization was 
very personalistic and paternalistic. Mao's party organization was anti-family and his own 
kin tended to oppose him. Thus, Mao intended to dismantle power of the Chinese family 
and empower those who remained loyal to the state. The people on the long march were 
not Mao's relatives, but long-term friends whom Mao could trust. Consequently Mao did 
not allow familism in state-owned enterprises. Loyal government officials, not family 
members were in-charge of these enterprises. 
Paternalism has significantly decreased in large state-owned enterprises.  First, 
there has been a gradual reduction of state control in planning and budgeting. Second, 
there has been a significant separation of power between the state and the enterprise. 77 
Third, more autonomy has been given to enterprise managers. All enterprises where I did 
interviewees had undergone decentralization of authority. 
A reduction in paternalism is also indicated the increased authority given to the 
general manager in negotiating and signing contracts with foreigners. 
The setting up of share-holding systems and the freedom to develop new products 
significantly also indicate reduced paternalism. 
The responsibility system indicates reduced paternalism in enterprise operations, as 
authority was delegated from the general manager down to employees. 
Thus, the strong cultural roots of paternalism have been significantly weakened in 
large state-owned enterprises, first from the state to the enterprises, and second from the 
managers to the workers in the enterprise itself. 
Personalism has been strongly retained in state-owned enterprises. I found no 
fundamental change in personnel policy, and only minor change in life-time employment. 
Though the central government encourages the free flow of labor, where enterprises can 
hire and fire employees, I found that none of four state-owned enterprises have fired their 
workers. 
Personalism has been retained because cultivating "guanxi" is still important. 
However, it has been slightly weakened in a sense that the central government discourages 
life-time employment and the 707 Research and Development Center started to partially 
pay for medical fees for its employees. These policies ultimately would undermine the 
mutual banding between an enterprise and its employees. 78 
Albeit, based on a limited number of cases of state-owned enterprises, I found 
familism remained unchanged, paternalism substantially reduced, and personalism still 
largely retained. 79 
CHAPTER 7
 
CONCLUSION
 
Summary 
We have seen that the transition to modern management practice has occurred at 
different times in different Chinese organizations, and that different organizations have 
different values and belief systems ranging from Confucian to Western in character. The 
three distinct features of familism, paternalism, and personalism have been examined as 
primary indicators of change. 
In small business organizations, I found very little changes in all the three features 
of familism, paternalism, and personalism. Family is very important in every culture, but 
especially important in Chinese culture. In small business organizations, it is very common 
to find that shareholders are all members of the family. Most businesses are still around 
and managed by a partnership among family members. Centralized power is highly 
maintained because of close association between ownership and control. The Chinese 
value of respect and compliance toward father-figure is still strongly maintained in small 
business organizations. The concern for human feelings and respect for human 
relationships are still in Chinese society. The cultivation of "guanxi" and the importance 
of having the right connections is still pervasive in small business organizations. Since 
small business organizations are a closed culture with a low level of interaction with 
foreign cultures, familism, paternalism, and personalism are not subjected to influences 
that would promote change. 80 
Large state-owned enterprises have undergone some remarkable changes starting 
in 1990. Inspired by the success of the SEZ, a number of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
began to introduce innovative technology that paved the way to the future. The 
importance of hierarchy is diminishing and there is more interaction among posts of the 
enterprise. Power has been largely decentralized from the state to local enterprise 
managers. But this does not bring modern management skills, just more autonomy to 
enterprise managers. The success of the responsibility system resulted in decentralization 
within the enterprise, more incentive for workers and an increase in profits. However, 
because of the heavy burden on life-time support for retired workers, life-time 
employment was being discouraged by the state. This attitude is detrimental to loyalty and 
trust among workers. Since large state-owned enterprises are not greatly influenced by 
the west; therefore, I found personalism still present despite the contrary policy of the 
state. 
Medium-size business organizations are changing the most because the SEZs allow 
greater influence from foreign cultures. I found the new medium-size enterprise 
management model has both traditional Chinese values and Western practices that 
encourage flexibility, innovation and assimilation of outsiders. Familism is partially 
retained in as far as shareholders are still family members, but partially reduced by hiring 
more professional managers as company grows in size. Paternalism is partially retained in 
the authority of the company head; yet, partially reduced as power has been distributed 
horizontally to professional managers. Personalism is partially retained by not firing 81 
employees but partially reduced by requiring less "guanxi" (connections) to get things 
done. 
In a culturally fluid environment where there is constant interaction with 
foreigners, medium-size enterprises in the SEZs are changing the most. Although there is 
change, change is still a matter of degree, and medium-size enterprises are not going to 
change to exactly like the West. Familism, paternalism, and personalism will not go away 
completely. In particular, personalism is pervasive in China and will be a persistent theme 
no matter what other changes occur. 
As China is opening up to the outside world and reforming economic policy, large 
state-owned enterprises have difficulty because of bureaucratic constraints from above and 
small enterprises have difficulty because of cultural constraints from below. Economic 
reform is taking off, pushed by medium-size enterprises with fewer constraints than the 
other two. Medium-size business enterprises are likely to be the primary force that will 
eventually modernize the Chinese economy. 
Suggestions and Recommendations 
The introduction of Western management techniques should not be done in such a 
way to be disruptive to Chinese culture. Production can be enhanced by giving employees 
a clear sense of duties and responsibilities as is done in Western business. However, the 
cultivation of "guanxi" (connections) as a mode of operation should be treated with great 
sensitivity because it is of utmost importance to building trust and strengthening the 
motivation and purpose felt by Chinese people. Thus, personalism should always retained. 82 
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Appendix A. Management Belief System Questionnaire 
Q#  Questions 
1 a  Employees are naturally lazy, they prefer to do nothing.
 
b  Employees are naturally active, they set goals and enjoy striving.
 
2a  Employees work mostly for money rewards. 
b  Employees seek job satisfaction, pride, and challenges in their work. 
3a  To keep employees productive is to demote or fire them.
 
b  To keep employees productive is to have them achieve goals.
 
4a  Employees are like child; they are dependence and irresponsible.
 
b  Employees are like adult; they are independence & responsible.
 
5a  Employees depend on direction from above; they do not think.
 
b  Employees see what is needed and are able to self-direct.
 
6a  Employees need to be trained of how to work.
 
b  Employees can improve their methods of doing.
 
7a  Employees need to watch closely to work without error.
 
b  Employees need to be respected and able to work right.
 
8a  Employees cares only about immediate material interests.
 
b  Employees seek meaning of live by caring nation and community.
 
9a  Employees not care about company policies such as safety and hygiene. 
b  Employees care about company policies and they participate. 
10a  Employees being treated with courtesy won't listen to you.
 
b  Employees appreciate your courtesy and respect you back.
 
12a  Employees naturally resist change; they prefer unchanged.
 
b  Employees tire of routine work and enjoy new experience.
 
I3a	  Jobs are primary and are fitted to predefined job.
 
Jobs are primary and jobs must be fitted to people.
 
14a  Employees remain static; don't learn new tricks.
 
b  Employees grow constantly; learn new things.
 
15a  Employees need to be pushed and to be driven.
 
b  Employees need to be encouraged and assisted.
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Appendix B. Management Techniques Questionnaire 
Q#  Question 
1  Would you allow workers have freedom in work? 
2  Would you allow workers to use their own judgment in solving problem? 
3  Would you allow workers a high degree of initiative? 
5  Would you trust workers to exercise good judgment? 
7  Would you encourage group coordination and team spirit? 
8  Would you feel workers efficient? 
9  How do you increase incentive of workers? 
12  Where are most of your workers come from? 
13  How do you select workers? 
14  Do you plan to run your own business? 
17  How often do you communicate to workers? 
18  Will you delegate power? 
23  Do you respect worker and trust them equally? 
24  Do you give clear instruction to workers? 
25  Do you allow workers to give you feedback? 
26  Do you respond to their feedback? 
27  Do you ever seek advice from workers? 
28  How do you make decision? Appendix C.  Location of Shenzhen SEZ 
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